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Abstract
Mortgage Default in Southern California: Examining Distressed
Borrower’s Decision Making and Market Contagion
By: Michael Wilkerson
Claremont Graduate University, 2012

This dissertation focuses on mortgage defaults in Southern California during
the housing bubble of the 2000s. The rapid decline in the housing market that
precipitated the current recession has been accompanied by an unprecedented
number of loan defaults and foreclosures. Recent studies have identified two major
theories of default—the “double trigger” hypothesis, where negative equity and an
income shock are necessary conditions for default—and “strategic default” where
negative equity is a sufficient condition for default. This paper adds to the default
literature by adding short sale as another possible outcome of mortgage default.
The primary goal is to analyze the determinants of mortgage default to assist
in understanding the conditions under which strategic behavior of home sales is
most likely to occur. Data from Los Angeles County was analyzed from 2007 to
2010 for every closed sale, then coded into three possible sales outcomes: 1)
Organic 2) Short Sale 3) Real Estate Owned (REO). A multinomial probit model was
used to model homeowner decision‐making based on the sale outcome. The model
rejected the “double trigger” hypothesis, as it was found that income shocks do no
have a significant effect on impacting the predicted probability for distressed sales.
Education levels, the sales price of homes, credit card debt, and market price
reductions were found to be significant variables in determining distressed sales
outcomes, thereby confirming the strategic default hypothesis.
The next section studied spatial association of short sales and REO to see if
any contagion effects were present. It was found that both short sales and REO form
into clusters of hot and cold spots. Social stigma is believed to impact consumer
behavior, the theory was confirmed through the findings of contagion and spatial
lag. The final section constructed a hedonic price model to capture the price effects
that distressed sales have on neighborhood pricing. Foreclosures were found to
have three times the negative impact on neighborhood pricing compared to short
sales.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
“When in October 2006 I participated in a panel sponsored by the Yale Investment Club, I shared the
dais with Frank Nothaft, chief economist at Freddie Mac. As I recall the event now, I asked him if
Freddie Mac had stresstested the impact on itself of a possible housing price decline. He answered that
they had, and they had even considered the possibility of a 13.4% national drop in home prices. I
protested: “what about the possibility of a drop that is bigger than that?” He answered that such a drop
had never happened, at least not since the Great Depression.” Shiller (2008)

This quote is chilling because it epitomizes the consensus view on the
housing market prior to the crash in 2008. Robert Shiller was apt to point out that
our standard economic models might be missing something; predicting a housing
crash of up to 50% (Barron’s 2005).

Smith and Smith (2006) created a model

focusing on calculating the present value of a home and the future expected cash
flow the asset will produce. They found that “buying a house at current market
prices appears to be an attractive long‐term investment.” During an economic
bubble, there is rarely consensus as to when the bubble will pop. As we now know,
Shiller was correct—a major housing market correction occurred, with prices falling
by more than 50% in certain markets (see figure 1). The recent “attention cascade”1
regarding the financial market meltdown has come to focus on foreclosures and
strategic default. Using Los Angeles County in Southern California as the area of
analysis, this study will closely examine the distressed housing market and the
resultant mortgage defaults.

1

Attention cascades occur when economic events or problems become the subject of more and more
talk and of stories in the media, until the come to dominate public thinking, Shiller (2008)

1

Figure 1 – Price Decline from Peak Market Price by City 200720112
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Prior to the housing bubble bursting, economic models focused primarily on
income shocks as the main determinant for foreclosures. An oft‐cited study
authored by Foote, Gerardi and Willen (2008), focuses on the Massachusetts
housing market in the 1990s.

Their findings were that negative equity is a

necessary but not a sufficient condition for foreclosure; estimating that less than
10% of homeowners with negative equity would face foreclosure. Analysts have
struggled to predict the timing of the eventual bottom of the current market
depression; as a result forecasts have varied in their estimates of the number

2

Data obtained from S & P Case Shiller Home Price Index ; peak price was determined for each
individual market, then used to calculate the percentage price drop for each year using the price level
from December for the years 2007‐2011

2

homeowners that are underwater3. In a 2009 study, Weaver and Shen estimated
that 26% of homeowners with mortgages were underwater — at the time, they
estimated the market would bottom out in the first quarter of 2011, with the
number growing to 48% expected to have negative equity at the predicted market
bottom.
Figure 2 – Case Shiller Home Price Index Time Series 20002012
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To date, home prices have continued to decline in most markets across the
United States, as a result previous studies have underestimated the duration of the
crash. The most recent S & P Case Shiller data as of Oct 2011, show that 19 of 20
markets declined in the most recent month (September 2011), and 18 of 20 markets
declined in the past year (October 2010). The 20 major market index decreased
3

Underwater is another term to describe negative equity – occurs when a homeowner owes more on
their mortgage than the fair market value of their home

3

1.2% from September to October 2011, while declining 3.4% from October 2010 to
2011. Prices have currently dropped back to 2003 levels (see figure 2), although the
rate of decline has decreased in 14 of 20 markets from October 2010 to 20114. As
prices continue to decline, the amount of borrowers with negative equity increases.
Corelogic (2011) estimates that as of the 3rd quarter 2011, 10.7 million or 22.1% of
residential properties with mortgages were underwater.

This number varies

greatly by state—Nevada is the highest with 58% of borrowers underwater, New
York is the lowest at 6.3%, while California is at 29.7% (see figure 3).
Figure 3 – Negative Equity Percentage by State 3Q 2011  Corelogic
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Until this most recent housing crash, there have never been instances of such
severe market corrections—accordingly, previous studies focusing on market
shocks are likely to have underestimated the effect negative equity has on a
4

Phoenix increased at an annual rate of .3% from September to October 2011, while Detroit
increased 2.5% and Washington D.C 1.3% from October 2010 to 2011.

4

borrowers decisions to default. An example of this would be Smith and Smith’s
assertion that in the residential real estate market, “homebuyers generally do not
calculate present values” (2006). Studies incorporating data from the past few
years, however, show that negative equity does play a significant role in a
homeowner’s decision to default on their mortgage. Butta, Dokko and Shan (2010)
focus on borrowers with mortgages originating in 2006 in Florida, California and
Nevada and estimate that 20% of defaults are strategic.
Homeowners generally walk away from their homes due to present
valuations and affordability issues, however negative equity also impacts the
homeowner’s efforts to refinance, thereby effecting affordability if the mortgage has
adjustable rates. Mortgage rates have lowered significantly during the housing
crash and if homeowners were able to refinance their mortgage it would create
more affordable monthly payments. Negative equity prevents most borrowers from
refinancing as “they do not have the means or willingness to bring potentially
substantial personal funds to the transaction,” unless they are able to qualify for a
government loan modification program5 (Fed 2012).
Borrowers with adjustable rate mortgages have greatly impacted the
mortgage landscape. Borrowers with adjustable rates are unable to reduce their
payments and incur increasing payments as their initial rates expire. Figure 4
shows a time series of adjustable rate mortgage resets from 2007 through 2015.
The number of resets does not begin to reduce significantly until the middle of 2012,
including the last remaining option adjustable rate reset. These types of loans allow
5

see http://www.makinghomeaffordable.gov/programs/lower‐payments/Pages/hamp.aspx for
information on the HAMP and HARP modification programs

5

the borrower to ability to choose their payment, including the ability to pay less
than the interest‐only payment, thereby adding to their mortgage balance every
month until the cap is reached. These borrowers face the largest monthly payment
increase at the reset due to the change in structure that requires them to begin
paying down interest in addition to an increase in rate from the initial “teaser” rate.
Figure 4 – Adjustable Rate Mortgage Resets6

For the purpose of this study, Strategic Default is defined as when a
homeowner defaults on his mortgage when he is able to continue making regular
payments. The strategic reason to default would be to eliminate the under‐water
(negative equity) condition of any owned property. This decision would serve to
accomplish two main objectives—increasing an owner’s net worth by selling an
asset that is worth less than is owed, and increasing monthly cash flow. For owner

6

see http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2007/02/pdf/chap1.pdf

6

occupied residences, increasing monthly cash flow is achieved by purchasing or
renting new housing for less than the current monthly mortgage payment.
Figure 5 – Borrower Default Flow Chart
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At the point of a borrower’s default there are only two possible outcomes –
curing the default or disposition of the property. Figure 5 shows the various
possibilities and outcomes for a borrower once they default on their mortgage7.
Assuming that the borrower does not become current on their payments, the end
result is likely to be a short sale or a foreclosure resulting in an REO8. The other
possible outcomes of default could be a deed in lieu of foreclosure or that the
foreclosure is purchased at auction by a private party, thus not returning to the
bank as an REO. Neither of these possibilities occurs often, additionally, data is not

7

see Mallach (2010) for further explanation of the foreclosure track process
REO is an abbreviation for Real Estate Owned, it is a property that a lender has taken back through
the foreclosure process

8

7

readily available to capture the outcomes; therefore the focus of this study will be
on short sales and REO as the two possible outcomes for a distressed sale.
Southern California is an ideal location to study due to the volume of sales,
diversity of control variables, but most importantly the large rise and subsequent
decline in the home prices from 2000 to 2010. California was one of the top states
in appreciation rate during the rise of the housing market; not surprisingly, it was
also one of the top states for depreciation once the housing market bubble burst. It
now boasts one of the highest rates of foreclosure in the country, making it an ideal
candidate for empirical study. Areas of the country that did not experience such
variance in the housing market do not make for interesting studies of strategic
default.

A necessary condition for strategic default is negative equity; studies

looking at strategic default in previous downturns did not observe a high
occurrence due to the minimal decline in market prices. Studying data from this
downturn in markets that experienced less than a 20% decline would yield similar
results to previous studies9.
The dataset used for this study is a complete record of all sales in Los Angeles
County from 2006‐2010. Sales data was taken directly from SoCal Multiple Listing
Service (MLS) at the address level, and includes a detailed record about the
property, including the actual date and condition of sale. For this study, each sale is
coded into one of three categories – 1) organic sale 2) Short Sale or 3) REO. The
timing of the dataset will allow for a unique perspective on the emergence of
consumer behavior. In 2006, less than 1% of sales were distressed sales; 2006 will
9

see Foote, Gerardi, and Willen (2008) and their review of Massachusetts during the 1990’s.

8

not be incorporated extensively in this study, but rather used to determine a
baseline. Figure 6 shows a time series by sale type for 2007‐2010. The emergence
of distressed sales occurred during 2008; in December 2007, they represented less
than 10%, by December 2008 they had grown to over 50%. While the percentage of
distressed sales has remained relatively constant since 2008, the ratio of short sales
to REOs has fluctuated (see Figures 7 and 8).
Figure 6 – Sale by type in Los Angeles County

An additional important variable to consider is that California is a non‐
recourse state. In California, lenders cannot pursue borrowers for a deficiency
judgment if they default on a purchase money loan on their primary residence.
Ghent and Kudlyak (2009) showed that state law regarding deficiency judgments
was an important variable in a homeowner’s decision to default. This is an

9

important detail when looking at the decision to short sale versus simply defaulting
on your payments until the lender eventually forecloses.

In recourse states,

borrowers are incentivized to short sell their property in the hopes of avoiding
deficiency judgments. In California, borrowers who simply purchased a home are
not incentivized for this reason, however, may be looking to minimize transaction
costs such as minimizing damage to their credit score. If a mortgage is held on an
investment property, or taken out as a cash‐out refinance or equity line, the
borrower would be subject to recourse10.
Figure 7 – Distressed Sales Breakdown in Los Angeles County

10

see section 580e ‐ http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi‐bin/displaycode?section=ccp&group=00001‐
01000&file=577‐582.5 ‐ recent changes in CA state codes have eliminated the concern for recourse,
however, during the sample it was still a relevant concern for borrowers

10

Figure 8 – Sales in Los Angeles County (not Seasonally Adjusted)

Given these conditions, we can hypothesize that people short selling their
homes are much more likely to strategically default than people who are foreclosed
upon. If a borrower is not subject to a deficiency judgment, but opts to short sell
their house, his or her motivation would be to lower their transaction costs. This
can be considered a strategic option; if he or she did nothing they would be
foreclosed upon, by choosing to short sell they are acting in their self‐interest. If a
borrower were able to continue making payments, but realized the expected utility
of default is greater than continuing to make payments, a short sale is a preferred
outcome to foreclosure.

11

The benefits to a borrower associated with both short sales and foreclosures
are that they both eliminate negative equity, they can live rent free while not making
payments, and future rental housing would be at a lower monthly cost.

The

additional benefits to a short sale are the certainty of a planned move out date, and
the ability to extend the trustee sale while the short sale is being negotiated. The
costs that are similarly associated with both short sales and foreclosures are moving
costs, the loss of any intrinsic value of home ownership, and the tax deductions from
homeownership.
The negative aspects of a foreclosure are greater than a short sale in two key
ways—a foreclosure damages credit scores more than a short sale, and foreclosures
have a greater social stigma. Foreclosures are a more public process than short
sales, as the notice of default is visibly posted on the property, thus it is expected to
generate a greater social stigma. Previous costs such as potential deficiency
judgments from foreclosures and borrowers needing to bring cash to close or sign
promissory notes for short sale have been rendered moot due to recent changes in
California law 11, however during the data sample were relevant costs to consider.
Depressed housing prices have a negative spillover effect on the overall
economy; as such the government has tried to enact various public policy programs
to help stimulate the housing market. There are two main channels for which the
value of the housing stock interacts with the economy – the income effect and the
wealth effect.

The income effect was present when borrowers were able to

withdraw equity from their homes to supplement their income levels. As the
11

see section 580e ‐ http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi‐bin/displaycode?section=ccp&group=00001‐
01000&file=577‐582.5
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housing prices crashed, this supplemental income and economic stimulus
evaporated. The wealth effect is reflected by the change in consumer consumption
based on various levels of perceived wealth. A good proxy to represent the wealth
effect is the ratio of home price to disposable personal income (see Figure 9).
Stabilizing home prices would serve to increase the income and wealth effects and
would help stimulate economic growth.
Figure 9 National Home Price to Disposable Income per Capita12

Figure 10 represents the various types of default as defined by Oliver
Wyman/Experian (2011). In their study they define strategic default as a borrower
who goes straight from 60 days past due to 180+ past due, while continuing to pay
on their non‐mortgage related debts such as credit cards or auto loans. They
12

chart from http://www.housingviews.com/2011/12/29/rent‐buy‐and‐price‐income‐ratios‐look‐
positive/
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suggest that if a borrower were truly distressed, they would cease all payments;
these borrowers are represented by the distressed defaults category. The most
drastic change since 2004 has been the reduction in the amount of borrowers who
cure their debts after going 60 days past due. In 2005, 40% of borrowers became
current again, this number has steadily declined and as of 2010 was only 3%.
Understanding the consumer decision‐making process once default occurs is now
crucial, given that almost every default leads to a distressed sale.
Figure 10  Mortgage Default Segments for 60 Days Past Due Borrowers
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The focus of this dissertation is to determine under what conditions people
choose to strategically default. By focusing on differentiating the types of default,
short sale versus foreclosure, this study will add to the existing literature on
strategic default.

When a homeowner with negative equity wants to sell their

home, they must seek the approval of the lender in order to walk away without
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bringing funds to the closing of escrow to make up for the equity shortfall.
Borrowers facing default can choose to do nothing, until which time the lender
forecloses, or they can take a proactive approach, contacting the lender and listing
their property for short sale. This critical choice the borrower makes can have a
significant personal impact but also create a local effect by influencing the decision
of others and the subsequent market response. The vast majority of studies on
strategic default focus on the effect of negative equity on foreclosure, but do not
look at short sale as another potential option for a homeowner.
Foreclosures have shown to have a contagion effect, a negative externality,
on nearby property values. This study will expand on previous research, also
incorporating short sales into the analysis in order to completely measure the effect
that defaults have on neighborhood property values. Differentiating the borrowers
decision‐making process will allow for public policy recommendations to reduce the
number of foreclosures. Similarly, if the price contagion effects of foreclosures are
shown to be more deleterious to neighborhood prices, the economic impact to
communities can be reduced through effective policy.

15

Chapter 2
Modeling Consumer Behavior: The Choice Between Short Sale and
Foreclosure
“Even if home prices stabilize, it seems unlikely that we will again see the confluence of factors (or one
might say mistakes and debacles) that facilitated the millennial wave of consumption. For many, the
home has morphed from piggy bank to albatross. The questions now are, how will this wealth
destruction drag on consumption and how will outsized mortgage burdens be resolved?” Weaver and
Shen (2009)

Introduction
This dissertation begins by studying the choices borrowers facing mortgage
default have at their disposal if they are not able or choose not to cure their
mortgage deficiency. When a borrower falls behind on their mortgage payments,
the lender will issue a notice of default and if the borrower takes no other action, he
will eventually face a foreclosure. Borrowers have another option, they can contact
their lender and opt instead for a short sale, whereby they will sell their home for
less than is owed to the owner of the mortgage note. This is a strategic choice that
borrowers have the ability to exercise. This purpose of this chapter is to create an
empirical model that will aid in predicting the critical choice consumers facing
mortgage default have to make.
Southern California will be used as the area of analysis for this study; it
makes for an ideal location to study based on the volume of sales, diversity of
control variables, but most importantly the large rise and subsequent decline in the
home prices from 2000 to 2010. It now boasts one of the highest rates of foreclosure

16

in the country, making it an ideal candidate for empirical study of distressed sales.
The current literature focuses almost entirely on foreclosure as the outcome of
mortgage default, in doing so they omit short sales as another possible outcome to
default.

Short sales account for 14% of all sales in the sample, compared to

foreclosures, which represent 28% of the sample; omitting short sales from the
analysis of distressed borrowers would skew the results as they account for a large
portion of sales outcomes.

Studies using data from previous market downturns

were not able to factor in such significant price drops, therefore their findings do
not accurately depict current market conditions.

This study will add to the

literature by using current data from 2006 through 2010, but also by adding short
sale as another possible outcome for mortgage default.
What follows next is a review of the literature on mortgage default,
specifically focusing on recent developments regarding theory on strategic default.
Next, it will develop the methodology used to model borrower decision‐making and
predict the theoretical relationships between the variables. The following section
will present the results of the mortgage default decision‐making model, as well
compare the findings to the predicted outcomes. Finally, the chapter ends by
interpreting the results from the model and offering public policy recommendations
based on the findings.

17

Literature Review
Research on strategic default is a recent development as an area for study.
This section will begin with a brief look at the first articles written on default, then
focus on the current literature.
Early literature on mortgage default positioned the option to default
similarly to a put on a stock option. The put option—mortgage default—would be
exercised when it was in the money13, which in this case meant negative value of the
mortgage. Foster and Van Order (1984, 85) studied whether homeowners were
“ruthless,” defaulting immediately when there was negative value of the mortgage.
In an economic model without transaction costs, it would be expected that people
would default ruthlessly, however their findings did not confirm the theory.
Instead, they posited that only 4.2% of mortgages with the loan to value ratio14 in
excess of 110% defaulted, attributing this to “transaction costs that, presumably,
drive the model” (1984).
The transaction costs associated with mortgage default have been estimated
as an explanation for why non‐ruthless mortgage default occurs. Cunningham and
Hendershot (1984) created a theoretical model to estimate the benefits to default as
compared to the costs associated with exercising the put option. The gains to be
expected from default are the recapture of negative equity and the free rent gained
between the time of default and foreclosure. The costs would include the quality of
13

An option is in the money when the price crosses the exercise price. In the case of a put, when the
price of the good drops below the exercise price, it is said to be in the money. If the price continues
to drop, it has no impact to the owner of the put, as they can sell the good for the exercise price of the
option.
14 Loan to value(LTV) ratio = price of the home/value of the mortgage, in this case a LTV ratio of
110% would mean the home is 10% underwater
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housing alternatives, the recourse from the lender, and their “psychological
aversion” to default. It is assumed that owning is preferred to renting; the authors
estimate that a foreclosure would prevent an individual from obtaining credit for
another mortgage for up to ten years. They factor this in as a cost to default in terms
of the present value of owning versus renting for an extended period. In their
simple model, if the costs of default exceed the benefits, a homeowner would not
exercise the put option on the mortgage. They estimate that the cost of default for a
household to be between 20 and 25 percent of the value of the house.
Kau, Keenan and Kim (1993, 94) look at loan to value at origination as an
important variable in understanding the exercising of the mortgage put option. They
constructed a theoretical model to forecast the differing probabilities for default by
changing the initial conditions and inserting shocks. House price variance was used
as one of the experimental variables; 15% was chosen as the maximum variance.
They found that LTV at origination to be a significant variable, for price decreases of
15%, they found that loans with 80% LTV at origination would default 2.85% of the
time; while mortgages with 95% LTV at origination would default 19.06% over the
30 year duration of the mortgage. Other factors they considered were interest rates
and transaction costs. They note, however, that it isn’t the lack of transaction costs
that lowers the probability of default, but similar to stock options, when the option
is in the money, it does not always get exercised. The homeowner always has the
ability to default in the future if prices continue to decrease.
The aforementioned studies were all successful in identifying the important
variables in the homeowner’s decision‐making process to default on their mortgage.

19

None of these studies however, were able to utilize actual data in drawing their
conclusions of how homeowners would react in extreme drops in the housing
market. For example, Kau, Keenan and Kim (1993,94) used 15% as the maximum
price reduction in their model, in the recent housing crash, some markets
experienced more than a 50% drop.

Recent studies have had the benefit of

analyzing this recent crash to see whether people default ruthlessly, or if other
factors such as transaction costs affect their decision to walk away from their home.
The current literature has formed two hypotheses—the double trigger default and
the strategic default.
The double‐trigger hypothesis is that negative equity is a necessary, but not
sufficient condition for default. Proponents of this view argue that an income shock
is needed in addition to negative equity in order for a default to occur—they do not
believe in ruthless default. The main study cited that supports this view is the
Boston Fed report authored by Foote, Gerardi, and Willen (2008). They studied
homeowners in Massachusetts who had negative equity in the early 1990s and
found that less than 10% of these homeowners eventually lost their home to
foreclosure. Based upon their findings, they conclude, “borrowers with negative
equity and a stable stream of income will, in most cases, prefer to continue making
mortgage payments.”

In addition to finding strategic default to be a minor

occurrence, they also argued that the government should not sponsor any
homeowner retention policies such as loan modifications. Based on the notion that
income shocks are the necessary condition for default, any polices designed to lower
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payments would find that “the costs of forgone income from borrowers who would
have made payments often exceeds the benefits of fewer foreclosures.”
Subsequent studies have found a preponderance of evidence pointing to
strategic default as a much more likely explanation describing homeowners use of
the put option. Within the extant literature, studies have focused on recourse vs.
non‐recourse states, borrower credit scores, the types of mortgages initially
obtained, and home equity loans as explanatory variables to help understand
borrowers motives for strategically defaulting.
The latter of these examples, home equity extraction, is an example of a
borrower worsening their initial condition by taking on additional debt. Home
equity loans were often referred to as a home ATMs, as home prices continued to
increase, the cash availability on home equity loans continued to increase. Once the
market peaked and subsequently crashed, the homes, and specifically additional
home equity loans, “morphed from piggy bank to albatross” (Weaver and Shen
2009). Mian and Sufi (2010) estimated that homeowners borrowed 25% of all the
home equity gains from 2002 to 2006. Their findings were that 1.25 trillion dollars
in household debt from 2002 to 2006 was attributable to increased borrowing
against the value of the home. In their study of defaults between 2006 and 2008
they found that 39% of borrowers who defaulted had borrowed “aggressively
against the rising value of their houses.”
Homeowners taking out additional home equity mortgages in combination
with declining market prices resulted in an unprecedented level of underwater
borrowers. Another major contributing factor to the rise in negative equity was the
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types of loans used to purchase homes. Exotic loans where people could put as little
as 0% down became commonplace; with 100% financed properties, any decline in
the market immediately causes negative equity. Prior to the loosening of down
payment and underwriting standards, homeowners that put 20% down could
withstand most market corrections without going underwater. Butta, Dokko and
Shan (2010) studied what they believed to be the most likely group of homeowners
to default to determine, at the extreme, how prevalent strategic default could be.
Their study only focuses on homeowners who purchased homes in 2006 with 0%
down payments in Arizona, California, Florida, and Nevada. These homeowners
purchased right before the crash; as a result they would not have experienced much
appreciation, but could have seen depreciation by more than 50% in the following
two or three years.

Their findings were that the median borrower does not

strategically default until equity falls to 62% of their homes value (38%
underwater). However, once negative equity reaches at least 50%, then half of the
defaults are driven by negative equity. Of all the homeowners in the study, they
found that only 20% of all defaults were strategic.
Looking at cross sectional data across states can omit important differences
in state laws that would effect the decision to strategically default. One such crucial
difference is the ability of lenders to pursue borrowers for a deficiency judgment in
the case of default. In recourse states, lenders can sue the borrower for damages for
any amount the lender isn’t able to recover from the sale of the property including
any legal costs associated with a foreclosure. Some states, however, are non‐
recourse states; in such states, if a borrower defaults on a loan, the lender cannot
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pursue the borrowers for any losses. Therefore, borrowers in non‐recourse states
are more likely to exercise the default option, as the transaction costs are much
lower than when a lender can pursue a deficiency judgment.
Ghent and Kudlyak (2009) look at mortgage default and separate states
according to their recourse laws. They find that the probability of default is 20%
higher in states with no recourse; however, they find that this difference is only
present for borrowers with significant assets. For borrowers with no assets, the
threat of a deficiency judgment carries no additional deterrence; they have no assets
to protect from lender lawsuits. The authors used purchase price of the home as a
proxy for wealth, finding a positive correlation between purchase price and default.
For houses worth less than $200,000, there was no difference based on recourse. As
prices increased to the $300,000 to $500,000 range, they found that borrowers in
non‐recourse states were 59% more likely to default.
Another variable to consider is the credit score of the borrower; when taking
transaction costs into account, high credit score borrowers would face higher
transaction costs than those with low credit scores. It takes years to rebuild credit
scores; therefore borrowers with higher credit scores should in theory face higher
transaction costs due to the value they place on having good credit. Oliver Wyman
(2009) partnered with Experian to conduct a study focusing on identifying patterns
for strategic defaulters. This research design included the pairing of mortgage data
along with credit report information for borrowers; this unique data allowed the
researchers to incorporate consumer decision‐making into their model.
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The Wyman‐Experian study defines strategic default occurring when a
borrower is only in default on their mortgage, but not any of their credit cards or
other monthly debt payments. In addition, borrowers must go straight from current
to 60+ days delinquent, that is to say borrowers who fall 30 days behind and then
cure the debt would be excluded in the future when they fall 60 days late. Using this
definition, they found that 18% of mortgages in default in the fourth quarter of 2008
could be defined as strategic. In California from 2005 to 2008, there was an
estimated 6800% increase in the number of strategic defaults. The study also found
that borrowers with higher origination balances and high credit scores were more
likely to be strategic defaulters. Looking at borrowers with Vantage Scores higher
than 900, they accounted for 30% of all mortgages, but only 3% of all defaults.
However, within the small number of defaults, 27% were found to be strategic,
compared to 15% of the overall population. This indicates that high credit score
borrowers were twice as likely to strategically default than the mean population.
The first survey conducted regarding individual’s thoughts on strategic default
was published by Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2009).

Using data from the

Financial Trust Index (FTI)15, they studied the impact of certain demographic
variables on a borrower’s propensity to strategically default given a hypothetical
underwater condition. The authors used age as a proxy for relocation costs, since it
is assumed that older people have higher relocation costs, partially due to having
children, therefore more of an attachment to the community. Their findings were
that people over 65 were more likely to default strategically. When looking at
15

www.financialtrustindex.com ‐ compiled by the University of Chicago Booth School of Business
and the Kellogg School of Management at Northwestern University
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income levels, they found a negative correlation to strategic default, however, the
findings were not statistically significant in their models. The inclusion of ethnicity
variables did not prove to be generally statistically significant in most models,
however, Hispanics were positively correlated when looking at the possibility of
being $100k underwater. Employment levels were statistically significant, but had
no real impact on default with a coefficient of .001. When surveyed, people with a
college education, were less likely to say that strategically defaulting was morally
wrong. Finally, ceteris paribus, people who have been in their home for more than 5
years were 78% less likely to default.
Fannie Mae conducts a National Housing Survey quarterly, the 3rd quarter
2011 survey focused on demographic characteristics of underwater homeowners
compared to all homeowners with a mortgage (Fannie Mae 2011).

Fewer

underwater homeowners graduated college than the mean sample of all owners
with a mortgage; 40% compared to 48% of all mortgagees. The age profile for both
groups was almost the same, with 11% of homeowners and underwater borrowers
being over 65 years old. For underwater homeowners, 28% are between 50 and 64,
while the number for all owners with a mortgage drops to 25%. Underwater
homeowners were also more likely to be from minority groups; 14% were Black and
12% Hispanic, compared to 9% Black and 10% Hispanic for all homeowners with a
mortgage. Income levels for underwater borrowers were slightly lower than those
of all borrowers; 35% were between $50k and $99k, compared to 39% for all
borrowers.

Finally, underwater borrowers reported having fewer assets; 71%

reported having less than $100k in assets, compared to 64% of all borrowers.
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A different research design to model strategic behavior is to create a
consumer decision model where each mortgage outcome is either current on their
payment or results in a distressed sale. An example of this methodology was
employed by Bajari, Chu, and Ming (2008) in their study of subprime loans between
2000 and 2007. The authors obtained national individual level mortgage data from
Loan Performance (LP) for a sample of sub prime mortgages. Monthly payments
were coded as either current or as a default ending in foreclosure. LP made some
individual borrower characteristics available such as the term of the loan, initial
interest rate, level of documentation, appraised value and FICO score. The initial
value of the home was merged with the S&P Case Shiller Home price index for each
of 20 major markets, then adjusted monthly to track the changes in market pricing.
Additionally, Census data was merged at the zip‐code level for demographic
variables such as per‐capita income, education, age and ethnicity and included as
explanatory variables in the study.
Using a bivariate probit to model the loan outcome for the sample of sub‐
prime borrowers, Bajari, Chu, and Ming (2008) found that a 20% decline in home
prices would make the borrower 15.38% more likely to default than a similar
borrower who did not experience any price reduction. Their findings were that
income and employment levels were both significant; a one standard deviation
increase (12%) in the ratio of income to mortgage payment leads to a 17.15%
increase in the probability of default. Similarly, a one standard deviation increase in
the unemployment rate (1.42%) led to a 10.09% increase in the probability of
default.
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Theory and Methodology
The choice borrowers face when they have defaulted on their mortgage can
be classified as a discrete categorical unordered choice. The dependant variable is
represented by the 3 categories of real estate sales (1) Organic Sale – A non‐
distressed sale (2) Short Sale – sale requiring lender approval where the sale price is
below what is owed on the mortgage (3) REO – Sale by lender after the property has
been foreclosed. In order to model the choice an individual faces, a Multinomial
Probit model (MNP) will be employed. Individuals in the MNP are assumed to be
utility maximizers who will choose the option that maximizes their utility—the
summation of the probability for the three possible outcomes must always be equal
to one. The base case for the MNP will be REO, once borrowers default on their
mortgage, they must decide to take action in order to avoid foreclosure. This would
be the natural outcome if no action were taken, and functions as the base case. The
base case allows us to model the decision choice between foreclosure and short sale
for that borrowers who have defaulted on their mortgage face. The MNP does not
have the assumption of independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA), therefore any
possible omitted choices would not change an individual’s evaluation of one
alternative relative to another.
The sales level data was taken from SoCal MLS, it was exported for all closed
sales in Los Angeles county from Jan 1, 2006 through Dec. 31 2010. Each individual
sale was coded as either an organic, short sale, or REO based on the information
contained in the “sold terms” or “special conditions” categories.

In order to

determine the annual change in price for each census tract, the mean price per
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square foot (psqft) of all closed sales was calculated. Using 2006 as the baseline for
price per square foot, a price change was calculated for each year between 2007‐
2010. For any given year x:
Pricechange (x)= ((psqft(x) – psqft2006) / psqft2006))
Table 1 – Summary Statistics by Sale Type and Price Drop
Variable
Short Sale
Short Sale
Short Sale
Short Sale
Short Sale
REO
REO
REO
REO
REO
Price
Price
Price
Price

-

N
-

2007
2008
2009
2010
All

2007
2008
2009
2010
All

Change
Change
Change
Change

-

2007
2008
2009
2010

1972
1969
1985
2044
2047

Mean
0.0224
0.0822
0.1245
0.1956
0.1429

Std. Dev
0.0501
0.099
0.1003
0.1134
0.0769

1972
1969
1985
2044
2047

0.0322
0.2754
0.3542
0.247
0.2882

1957
1947
1962
1985

-0.0317
-0.262
-0.3793
-0.3367

Min

Max
0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
0.75

0.0686
0.2264
0.237
0.1461
0.1618

0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
1

0.135
0.152
0.1678
0.1978

-0.6163
-0.7957
-0.8284
-0.8822

2.81
0.4769
0.5352
1.39

The price change for each individual sale is represented by the aggregate
price drop of all sales within the given census tract18. Table 1 contains the summary
statistics for the sale type and price drop statistics19. The percentage of short sales
in Los Angeles County increased in every year from 2007 through 2010, while the
mean percent (14.29%) was higher than in any year but 2010 (19.56%). The

18

Using mean price per square foot prices for a given census tract is a good proxy for understanding
local market conditions. Other measures such as mean sales price do not account for quality or size
of homes, therefore do not accurately reflect changes in market prices, but rather are skewed to
reflect the types of homes sold in a given period. Similarly, measures using the repeat sales
methodology are only available at the city and MSA level, therefore do not accurately reflect local
market changes.
19 Organic sales summary statistics were not included as they are not the area of focus for this study,
the percent of organic sales can be calculated by taking 1 minus the total percent of short sales and
REOs.
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percentage of REO sales increased from 2007 to 2009, then decreased in 2010.
Prices dropped from 2007‐2009, with the majority of the drop (23.1%) coming
between 2007 and 2008; prices then increased slightly in 2010 (4.2%).
Demographic variables were exported from Census Bureau data and from
supplemental census data contained on Simply Map20. Every sale was geo coded in
ArcGIS using the 2010 census shapefiles,21 then placed within the relevant census
tract; socio‐demographic variables were then aggregated to the census tract level on
an annual basis. The descriptive statistics for the independent variables used in the
MNP models can be found in Table 2. The data is for the years 2007 through 2010,
the 2054 census tracts in Los Angeles County have unique data for every year of the
sample.
Table 2 – Summary Statistics for SocioDemographic Variables
Variable
Employment
Income (Per Capita)
Income Shock
Sales Price
Education
Credit Card Debt
Net Worth
Stability
Owner Occupancy
Age
Asian
Hispanic
Black

N
234029
234026
233973

Mean
91.64
32296
30204

Std. Dev
6.04
22440
21812

234559
234559
234026
234486
234559
234559
234098
234559
234559
234559

553171
19.59
0.3087
599163
37.47
59.51
34.85
13.89
40.4
8.4

629866
11.07
0.2277
290424
11.48
24.31
6.85
14.03
29.48
14.31

Min

Max
14
1810
843

100
230620
230620

14500
0
0.009
83506
0
0
17
0
0
0

36700000
100
3.56
1973890
65
100
70
84
98
91

Proponents of the “double trigger” hypothesis (Foster and Van Order
1984)(Foote, Gerardi, and Willen 2008) argue that an income shock is required in
20
21

Simplymap.com
http://www2.census.gov/cgi‐bin/shapefiles2009/state‐files?state=06
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order for borrowers to choose to strategically default on their mortgage. The
alternative hypothesis—strategic default—proposes that negative equity is a
sufficient condition for strategic default and that an income shock is not necessary
(Cunningham and Hendershot 1984)(Butta, Dokko and Shan 2010)(Ghent and
Kudlyak 2009)(Oliver Wyman 2009)(Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2009).
The first component of an income shock is employment levels; the ideal
measure would be to have individual data on whether the borrower is currently
employed. For this study, a proxy of the average employment rate within the census
tract was used. Most studies utilize unemployment levels, however, based on the
persistent high rates of unemployment, the number of discouraged workers has
increased.

Individuals no longer looking for work are not included in the

unemployment numbers, therefore using the employment rate will capture the total
percent of people working rather than those simply looking for work. The
preponderance of the findings using data from the most recent market crash suggest
that income shocks are not a necessary condition for default; it is therefore expected
that employment will have an insignificant impact on default.
In addition to employment levels, income levels are also incorporated to
further analyze the impact of income shocks on default. The ideal measure of
income would be to have the income level for each homeowner in the sample. A
proxy for income was used, measured by the mean household income per capita for
each census tract. Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2009) found income levels to be
negatively correlated with strategic default, but it was statistically insignificant in
their model. The National Housing Survey (Fannie Mae 2011) found that income
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levels were lower for underwater homeowners than the general sample of all
borrowers. Bajari, Chu and Park (2008) studied a sample of subprime mortgage
from 2000 through 2007 and found that default is more prevalent in areas of lower
income. They found that taking the first difference of one standard deviation (12%)
in the ratio of mortgage payments to monthly income yielded a 17.15% increased in
the predicted probability of default. Based on the findings in the literature, it is
expected that income will have a negative impact on default, such that a raise in
income levels will lower the probability of all distressed sales.
A change in the price level of the home is represented by a proxy of the
change in the mean price per square foot of all sales since 2006. The data is
aggregated annually, so, for any given sale, the mean price from that year is
compared to the 2006 baseline. The ideal measure would be to have the actual
amount of equity for each homeowner at the time of sale for the entire sample. All
of the literature on mortgage default finds that a reduction in price is strongly tied
to an increase in defaults. Bajari, Chu, and Park (2008) found in their study of
borrowers with no down payment, that a 20% decline in home prices would lead to
a 15.38% increase in the likelihood of default. In a similar study of borrowers
financing 100% of the purchase price, Butta, Dokko and Shan (2010) found that the
median borrower does not strategically default until they are 38% underwater.
Based on the findings in the literature it is expected that a reduction in home prices
will have a strong positive relationship to default.
Taking the measures of income and employment individually does not
represent an income shock, but rather it is the combination of the two that creates
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the shock. Income shocks can be the result of either a reduction of income, or the
loss of employment, therefore a variable was constructed to represent the net effect
of employment and income. Income Shock is represented by the mean household
income per capita divided by the employment level in a census tract. The newly
created variable will allow for the direct testing of the double trigger hypothesis; the
construction of an interactive variable between price change and income shocks will
demonstrate whether both price changes and income shocks are necessary for
distressed sales to emerge.
Several models will be constructed based upon the theories presented in the
relevant literature. The first model—the baseline model—was created from the 3
variables listed above on their own: employment, income levels, and price
reduction. A second model—the income shock model—was created comprised of
the income shock and price change variables along with the interactive variable
between the two. The purpose of this model is to directly test the double trigger
hypothesis that states an income shock is a necessary condition for strategic default.
This model will allow for the comparison of the effects that income shocks and price
change have in combination on the borrowers decision to short sale or take no
action and be foreclosed upon by the lender.
A third fully specified model includes various socio‐demographic variables
that are identified in the literature in addition to the baseline model. The first of the
independent variables that will be added to the baseline model is education; it is a
measure of the percent of college graduates within the given census tract. This is a
proxy trying to capture the homeowners awareness of the cost benefit analysis of
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short sale compared to foreclosure. An ideal measure would be to have survey data
from homeowners selling their homes in the sample that captured the knowledge
regarding the cost or benefits regarding distressed sales outcomes. Guiso, Sapienza,
and Zingales (2009) found that people with a college education were less likely to
say that strategically defaulting was morally wrong. Similar results were found by
Bajari, Chu, and Park (2008), who found that default is more prevalent in areas with
less education (as measured by the percent of college graduates).

Anecdotal

evidence of education impacting decision‐making can be observed by the fact that
the Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA) defaulted and short sold their
headquarters. It is assumed that the MBA would be highly informed on the cost and
benefits associated with default, they decided to short sell rather than foreclose
based on their knowledge. Based on the literature, it is expected that education will
have a negative relationship to default.

Further, based on the net gains to

borrowers associated with short sales compared to foreclosures, it can be argued
that more informed borrowers will be equipped to calculate which outcome is in
their best interest.
The second variable added to the fully specified model is a measure to
capture the impact of credit card debt, in this case as a percent of income. The
income percentage is used in order to normalize the impact of the debt at various
levels of income. An ideal measure would be to have the debt‐to‐income ratio for
credit card debt for each homeowner in the sample. For the study, a proxy was used
comprised of the mean credit debt as a percentage of household income per capita
for each census tract. Including the consumer debt variable will aid in further
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examining the impact that income has on borrowers default decision‐making. In the
Wyman‐Experian (2011) study on strategic default, they identified strategic
defaulters as borrowers who continued paying their credit cards while defaulting on
their mortgages. It can also be surmised, that consumers use credit cards to make
up for income shortfalls, such that increased levels of credit card debt can be
interpreted as a measure of insufficient income to cover monthly expenses. It is
therefore expected that credit card debt will be positively related to default, but that
it should have less of an impact on short sales, which is more likely to be a strategic
behavior.
Conversely, the accumulation of assets indicates an income surplus, therefore
the inclusion of a net worth variable can be used as a proxy measuring consumers
that have sufficient income to cover their monthly expenses. The ideal measure
would be to have the income surplus for each individual borrower in order to
capture the homeowner’s ability to cover their mortgage.

Ghent and Kudlyak

(2009) studied the impact that deficiency judgments had on strategic default, in
doing so they used home price as a proxy for wealth. Their finding was that as
prices increased in non‐recourse states, borrowers were more likely to default. Net
worth is a measure of an individuals wealth, therefore it is expected that it will have
a positive relationship to default.
The next independent variable represents the makeup of residents within a
census tract; owner occupancy is a measure of the percentage of residents who are
occupying their primary residence. Rather than the proxy for the census tract level
data, the ideal measure would be the occupancy status for each individual
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homeowner, that is to say is the property a rental or owner occupied. Measuring the
profile of the census tract, however, does provide additional insight into the makeup
the neighborhood quality that is not captured by the individual property data. It
therefore serves as a valid measure for capturing neighborhood quality in addition
to acting as a proxy for individual level analysis.
The literature has mixed findings on the impact of owner occupancy on
default. Bajari, Chu, and Park (2008) found that 8.28% of loans held by investors
ended in default, the percentage increased to 11.02% for owner occupants.
Conversely, Cowan and Cowan (2004) in their study of subprime mortgages from
1995‐2001 found that properties owned by investors were three times more likely
to default ending in foreclosure than owner occupied homes.

In the Wyman‐

Experian (2011) on strategic default, they found that owner occupants (owners with
1 mortgage) were the least likely to strategically default, but the most likely to have
a distressed default. As the number of properties with mortgages increased, the
number of distressed defaults decreased, while the number of strategic defaults
increased22. Based on the literature, it is unclear what directional relationship
owner occupancy will have on default.
A related variable to owner occupancy is the duration that a resident has
lived at the same address. In order to capture stability within a neighborhood, the
percentage of occupants residing at the same address for 5 or more years (stability)
was added to the model. This measure is a good proxy for neighborhood quality, but
22

The study broke down 1 through 5 properties, and then had a category for 5+ properties.
Strategic default was estimated at 14% for borrowers with 1 mortgage and 40% for 5+ mortgages.
Distressed default was estimated at 35% for borrowers with 1 mortgage and decreased to 20% for
5+ mortgages.
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also an additional measure to capture individual’s social ties based on the duration
of residence in a community. Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2009) found that
people who have been in their home for more than 5 years were 78% less likely to
default. It can be argued that that longer individuals reside in a community, the
more they will develop social ties, and will therefore be less likely to ruthlessly
default. In addition to social ties, longer duration would imply that they purchased
during the rapid price appreciation period before the housing bubble burst23. Given
that likelihood of increased equity and stronger social ties, it is expected that
stability will be negatively related to default.
The last control variable included is the sales price for the actual home in the
data sample. This measure was included to determine if price level of the individual
property has an impact on the borrowers decision‐making. This is not being used as
a proxy to capture other measures of quality, but rather as an exogenous measure.
Sales price has been used in other studies to capture wealth (Ghent and Kudlyak
2009), in this case it is being used to capture any institutional incentives that may
exist to influence borrower decision‐making.
A third agent, in addition to the borrower and the lender, that is party to a
short sale transaction is the real estate agent. Short sales require additional time
and work to be completed by the real estate agent compared to an organic or REO
sale. As such, real estate agents are incentivized to focus on higher priced properties
so that they can be adequately compensated for their efforts. Ceteris Paribas, an
agent will receive a larger commission on a higher priced home than for a lower
23

Note that this is an observation based on the timing of the sample used for this study and not
necessarily an observation that is generalizable to other studies

36

priced home. Given the additional work performed by the real estate agent, it can be
argued that they may avoid marketing towards low priced properties. The expected
relationship is that sales price will be negatively related to distressed sales,
specifically favoring short sales at higher price points.
Finally, sets of demographic control variables were included in the model.
Median age, percentage of Asian residents, percentage of Hispanic residents, and
percentage of Black residents were all included in the fully specified model. Ideal
measures would be to have individual homeowner level data, rather than a proxy
for the census tract level data.
Findings and Analysis
Table 3 contains the results of the 3 multinomial probit models (MNP) where
sales type is the dependent variable; the models include all closed sales, coded as
either {1} organic {2} Short Sale or {3} REO (base outcome), in Los Angeles County
from January 1, 2007 through December 31, 2010. The relationship of interest is
the borrower’s decision between foreclosure and short sale—represented by
models 2, 4 and 6 in the results table. The direction sign of the coefficient indicates
the directional relationship the variable has relative to the base outcome (REO), the
value of the coefficients will be converted to a predicted probabilities for short sales
and REO so that the directional relationship of the independent variable can be
determined (see table 4 and figure 12). The statistical significance of coefficient the
represents whether the variable impacts the borrowers decision between the
outcome and the base case; the statistical significance of the predicted probabilities
are calculated separately.
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Table 3 – Baseline Multinomial Probit Model Results

Price Change

Employment

Income

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Baseline

Baseline

Income Shock

Income Shock

Full

Full

Organic

Short Sale

Organic

Short Sale

Organic

Short Sale

4.8*

1.31*

4.11*

1.63*

1.56*

.756*

(.03)

(.036)

(.045)

(.054)

(.057)

(.068)

-0.0085*

-0.01653*

(.00088)

(.001)

.0000175*

-.00000069

.0000024***

.0000084*

(.00000052)

(.00000067)

(.00000089)

(.0000011)

.0000254*

-0000241*

0.0000248*

-.0000234*

(.00000165)

(.000002)

(.0000018)

(.0000022)

0.0000119*

0.0000079*

(.00000027)

(.00000032)

Income Shock

Interactive (P & I)

Sales Price

Education

Credit Card Debt

Net Worth

Stability

Owner Occupancy

Age

Asian

Hispanic

Black

Constant

2.71*

1.25*

1.78*

-.0738*

.0000024*

.00000081*

(.00000002)

(.00000003)

.0027**

.0059*

(.0011)

(.0013)

-2.228*

-.4511*

(.0416)

(.0506)

-.0000066*

-.00000042*

(.00000005)

(.00000007)

.0126*

.0026*

(.00074)

(.00086)

-.00594*

-0.00007

(.00045)

(.00052)

-.0055*

-.0042**

(.0016)

(.0018)

.0011*

-.00165*

(.000441)

(.00053)

.00097**

-.00367*

(.0004)

(.00045)

-0.00079**

-.008*

(.00036)

(.00045)

1.56*

.1624*

(.082)

(.094)

(.017)

(.022)

(.063)

(.076)

N

232952

232952

232952

232952

232952

232952

Log Likelihood

-170777

-170777

-170444

-170444

-161778

-161778

45957

45957

45184

45184

51613

51613

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

Wald chi^2
Prob > chi ^2

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *p<0.01
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The baseline model measures the impact of employment, income level and
price change on sales outcome; the results confirmed the theory in the literature
that a reduction in price level has a positive impact on the probability of short sale
and REO. Income level also had the predicted negative relationship to both types of
distressed sales. Of note, was that employment had a negative relationship to short
sales, but a positive relationship to REO sales (determined based on the predicted
probability, not the coefficients in MNP model). Figure 11 displays the change in
predicted probability for a positive one standard deviation increase from the mean
values; all of the variables from the MNP and predicted probabilities were
statistically significant at the .01% level.
The second model specification tests the interaction of price and income
shocks in order to directly test the double trigger hypothesis. The income shock
variable, along with price change and the interactive variable, were included as the
independent variables. As predicted in the literature and confirmed in the baseline
model, price level reductions are positively related to both short sales and REO, this
relationship and the predicted probability were both significant at the .01% level.
Income shock was not found to be statistically significant in this model, although the
directional relationship was negative between short sales and REO, overall an
increased income shock level led to lower distressed sales.
In order to test the double trigger hypothesis, the impact of income needs to
be measured at various levels of price decreases. Figure 11 shows the effect of a
positive one standard deviation shift from the mean and the resultant change in
probabilities for the variables in the first two model specifications. In the first
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model, employment levels have almost no impact on the probability of default for
either short sale or foreclosure. The directional relationship is opposite, however,
with short sales being negatively related to employment levels, while REOs were
positively related. Income, measured by itself, or as an income shock had similar
effects in both models; the relationship was negative for both sales outcomes,
however, the effect on the probability of REO was greater than for short sales. Price
changes had the greatest impact of the three independent variables in both the
baseline and income shock models. The relationship of price decreases to both
short sale and REO is negative, although the impact on the predicted probability of
foreclosure is more than double that of short sales.
Figure 11 – Price and Income Effects for Baseline Model Specifications
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The findings of the baseline models do not lend support to the double trigger
hypothesis. The impact of income shocks will be further investigated in the fully
specified model where the impact will be measured at various levels of price
changes. The directional relationship of the coefficients of the fully specified model
are consistent with the baseline model; income shock becomes statistically
significant at the .01% level, along with all of the other variables except owner
occupancy which is not statistically significant, and age which is significant at the
.05% level.

The statistical significance of the variables measures their relative

impact in the decision‐making between short sale and REO, not on the directional
relationship to all sales outcomes. All variables were significant at the .01% level
when measuring the predicted probabilities, indicating the general direction and
slope of each of the variables relative to all sales outcomes. When taking into
account the slight changes in the coefficients from the baseline models, the resultant
change in predicted probabilities was minimal. Therefore, the findings in the fully
specified model will be used as the basis for the remainder of the analysis in this
section as they offer broader policy implications.
Table 4 lists the predicted probabilities for the fully specified MNP model for
their mean value, as well as a positive shift of one standard deviation. Predicted
probabilities were constructed by holding all variables constant at their mean, then
taking a first difference of one positive standard deviation in order to determine the
sensitivity of each variable to changes in values. Figure 12 displays a bar chart
showing the magnitude of the first difference change in predicted probability for
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each of the independent variables, the directional effects will be discussed below for
each of the variables individually.
Table 4 – First Difference Predicted Probabilities for Fully Specified Model
Mean Prob
Price Change

+1 St Dev Prob

+ First Difference

-25.5

-0.44

SS

11.85%

16.09%

4.24%

REO

20.38%

26.68%

6.30%

30204

52016

SS

11.85%

11.41%

-0.44%

REO

20.38%

22.33%

1.95%

$553,171

$1,183,037

9.78%

3.03%

-6.75%

14.47%

1.89%

-12.58%

19.59

30.65

9.78%

10.34%

0.56%

14.47%

13.87%

-0.61%

$599,163

$889,587

9.78%

10.03%

0.25%

14.47%

17.74%

3.27%

37.47

48.94

Income Shock

Sales Price
SS
REO
Education
SS
REO
Wealth
SS
REO
Stability
SS
REO
Credit Card Debt
SS
REO
Owner Occupancy
SS
REO
Asian
SS
REO
Hispanic
SS

9.78%

8.77%

-1.01%

14.47%

12.50%

-1.97%

31%

54%

9.78%

13.80%

4.02%

14.47%

23.17%

8.70%

59.51

83.82

9.78%

11.23%

1.45%

14.47%

16.54%

2.07%

13.88

27.91

9.78%

9.33%

-0.45%

14.47%

14.33%

-0.14%

40.4

69.87

9.78%

8.17%

-1.61%

14.47%

14.40%

-0.07%

8.4

22.71

9.78%

8.46%

-1.32%

REO

14.47%

14.99%

0.52%

Age

34.85

41.69

SS

9.78%

9.78%

0.00%

14.47%

15.10%

0.63%

REO
Black
SS

REO
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Taking the mean probabilities for all variables yields a 9.78% likelihood of
choosing short sale and 14.47% for foreclosure. The sales price of a home for REOs
was the most sensitive variable to a first difference change; with a one standard
deviation increase resulting in a 12.58% decreased likelihood of choosing
foreclosure. Age had the least impact of any variable with a one standard deviation
shift having no impact on the probability of a borrower selecting short sale. What
follows next is an in‐depth analysis of each of the variables, specifically constructing
a sensitivity analysis based on the entire range of possible values to compare their
impact on short sales and REO respectively.
Figure 12 First Difference Effect on Magnitude of Predicted Probabilities
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Figure 13 – Predicted Probability Chart for Price Change on Short Sales
!"&,-*%15*61,#7-*89-,(:*#1*!"#$%$&'&()*#;*0<#"(*0%'-*
./01#

2$#34"#5/6#

-$#34"#5/6#

./01#7189:/#

-$#34"#5/6#7189:/#

;2#$#34"#5/6#7189:/;#

;.<1#7189:/;#

;.0=#7189:/;#
!",#

!"+#

!"*#

!")#

!"#$%$&'&()*

!"(#

!"'#

!"&#

!"%#

!"$#

!"!#
-!"+#

-!"*#

-!")#

-!"(#

-!"'#
+*!"&,-*."#/*0&1,-*2334*

-!"&#

-!"%#

-!"$#

!#

Figure 13 depicts the change in predicted probabilities for short sales for the
entire range of values of a price decreases, holding all other variables at their mean
values except for income shocks. The five curves represent various levels of income
shocks for the entire range of price decreases. For all income levels, the first
difference is greater for a one standard deviation increase in price change; that is to
say, short sales are more responsive to large price decreases than they are to
smaller reductions. Furthermore, the predicted probabilities for the entire range of
income levels are almost identical at the mean price reduction of 25%.
Interestingly, as the price range decreases from the mean, the probability of short
sale is highest for the lowest income levels. The inverse is true as price reductions
increase away from the mean, with the higher incomes having the largest
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probability of short sale. The maximum income is an outlier to the data set, the
value of 230620 represent an income of $230,620 with 100% employment, high
income probabilities will be discussed further in the section below and are depicted
in figure 14.

These findings lend strong support to falsifying the double trigger

hypothesis, as income levels have little impact on affecting a change in probability at
any given price level.
Figure 14 – High Income Level Effects on Short Sale Probability
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The mean income shock for the sample is 30204, which can be represented
as an income of $30,204 with employment of 100% or income of $60,408 with 50%
employment. The maximum income shock in the study has a value of 230620,
which is 7.6 times greater than the mean, and is therefore an extreme outlier. A
more representative level of high income shock would be 100000, which is almost
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double the one standard deviation value of 52016. At this level of income shock, the
predicted probability is reduced at all levels of price decrease greater than the
mean, and increased for value less than the mean price drop. The difference in
probability for a greater price increase drops to 9.66% for an income shock level of
100,000 compared to the 28.75% change for the max income shock. As prices
increase from the mean price change level, the first difference changes are much
lower, 4.5% for 100000 income shock, and 7.5% for max income. The caveat to the
double trigger hypothesis would be that extreme high levels of income shocks and
price drops have an impact on the probability of short sale.
Income shocks have a similar impact on affecting a change in the predicted
probability of REO (see Figure 15), although the effect is more muted at high levels
of income. The five curves reflect the range of income from min to max; other than
at max income, the effect of varied income levels has very little impact on the
probability of REO. At the mean price change level of ‐25%, the first difference for a
one standard deviation increase in income is 1.95%, and for a decrease in income it
is 1.43%.

The findings provide a stronger refutation of the double trigger

hypothesis than the findings for short sales. Conversely, the findings support the
strategic default hypothesis for both short sales and REO, as changes in price
holding all other variables at their mean value do generate higher probabilities of
short sale and REO.

For a decrease in price of one standard deviation, the

probability of REO increases by 6.3%, a similar shift increasing prices yields a 5.71%
change.
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Figure 15  Predicted Probability Chart for Price Change on REO
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Figure 16 presents the predicted probabilities for high levels of income
shocks for the range of negative price changes. The max income shock curve has a
different functional form than the curve for short sales; the highest predicted
probability of REO is for price decreases of 35%. Short sales had the highest
probability of occurrence for the largest price reduction at the maximum income
level. Setting income shock to 100000 reduced the probability of REO at the mean
and at both one standard deviation levels compared to the max value.

The

difference in probability of REO at the mean price between income shock and
100,000 is 6%, which is greater than the impact on short sales at the same level. At
maximum income shock levels, a 75% price reduction leads to 99% of all sales being
distressed (short sale + REO), the probability drops to 86% at the 44% price drop
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level (a one standard deviation downward shift). As was the case with short sales,
extreme high values of income shock do have some effect on the probability of short
sale, however, within normal ranges of values the impact is negligible, therefore
confirming the strategic default hypothesis, and refuting the double trigger
hypothesis.
Figure 16  High Income Level Effects on REO Probability
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The range of predicted probabilities for education, holding all other variables
at their mean are displayed in figure 17. Education has findings that differ from the
expected relationships predicted in the literature; REOs have a negative relationship
to default as predicted, however short sales increase as the percentage of education
increases, which is the opposite effect predicted in the literature. Taking a first
difference has a negligible effect, at less than 1% each, however the opposite
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direction magnifies the effects. At the mean education level of 19%, the difference
between short sale and REO is 4.69%. However, when holding all other variables at
their means, at education levels of greater than 60%, the probability of short sale is
higher than REO. Also of note is the direct trade off borrowers are making of short
sales for REO; the percentage of organic sales is 75% for the entire range of
educational values. This indicates that in this circumstance, borrowers make a
direct substitution of short sale for REO as the level of education increases.
Figure 17  Predicted Probability Chart for Education
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The predicted probabilities for the range of sales prices (see table 18)
confirm the hypothesis presented regarding sales price. Sales price has a positive
coefficient for the decision relative to the base outcome of REO for homeowners,
however the relationship to distressed sales is negative as is predicted by the
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literature using sales price as a proxy for wealth. The first difference change is twice
as large for REO, as it is for short sales. As a result, the probability of short sale is
greater at sales prices higher than $850,000 and at the first difference price of
$1,183,032 (one standard deviation increase) shorts sales are 1.2% more likely
than REO.
Figure 18 – Predicted Probability Chart for Sales Price
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The fully specified model results show a negative relationship regarding
wealth for borrowers in the base case (REO) relative to short sales. For the range of
values, wealth has almost no impact on the probability of short sale, less than 1% for
the entire range of value (see figure 19). Conversely, the probability of REO is
greatly impacted by changing values of wealth in a census tract, holding all other
values at their mean. The first difference is 3.27%, however the slope of the curve is
positive and increasing at a positive rate, so the probability of REO relative to short
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sale continually increases. These findings, specifically regarding REO, are consistent
with the theories presented in the literature, which posited a positive relationship to
default.
Figure 19 – Predicted Probability Chart for Wealth
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Figure 20 shows the range of predicted probabilities for the average credit
card debt to income ratio per household for both distressed sale outcomes. As
predicted in the literature, there is a positive relationship between credit card debt
and distressed sales. Other than sales price decreases, probabilities for short sales
and REO were the most sensitive to one standard deviation changes. Short sales
were less sensitive to changes in credit card debt levels, an increase of one standard
deviation over the mean causes a 4.08% increase in probability. For REO the
magnitude was more pronounced; an increase of one standard deviation leads to a
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8.7% rise in the probability. For credit card debt‐to‐income levels greater than
100%, the probability of short sale begins to stabilize around 24%, while it
continues to increase greatly for REO, rising to a 64% probability of REO at the debt
to income ratio of 150%.
Figure 20  Predicted Probability Chart for Credit Card Debt
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The chart of predicted probabilities for housing stability is shown in figure
21 for the range of possible percentages of residents who have lived in the same
location for at least the previous 5 years. The findings confirm the predicted
negative relationship between homeowner stability and distressed sales, having a
similar effect on both sales outcomes. Stability has a slightly greater effect on the
probabilities of REO; a positive one standard deviation shift leads to a 1.97%
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decrease in probability. The impact is less on the probability of a borrower opting
for a short sale; with a positive first difference yielding a 1.01% decrease.
Figure 21 – Predicted Probability Chart for Stability
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The predicted probabilities for the final policy variable, owner occupancy are
depicted in Figure 22 for the range of all possible values in the dataset. There is not
consensus in the literature as to the expected directional relationship between
owner occupancy and default; the findings in this study show that there is a positive
relationship. The impact of owner occupancy is very similar for both outcomes of
distressed sale, taking a first difference yields an increase in probability of 1.45% for
short sales and 2.07% for REO. There is no relative impact for either type of sale as
the slopes of both curves are almost the same; this confirms the finding that the
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relationship was not statistically significant for the borrowers deciding between
REO and short sale.

Figure 22 – Predicted Probability Chart for Owner Occupancy
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For the final sets of control variables, charts of the predicted probabilities
will not be presented.

There are no theoretical arguments presented in the

literature as to the expected effect of these relationships; however, their impact on
homeowner decision‐making will be summarized below. Homeowner median age
in the census tract had no impact on the borrowers decision at any range of values
for short sales, and a first difference increase of .63% for REOs. Asian and Hispanic
populations had a negative relationship to both short sales and foreclosures,
although both were more sensitive to short sales. The first difference for Asian

54

population was minimal, at .45% for short sales and .14% for REO. For Hispanic
population, the likelihood of short sale reduced for a one standard deviation
increase by 1.61%, while the impact was negligible on REO affecting at .07%
reduction. The percent of black population had different directional effects, with
short sales being negatively related, while REOs were positively related. The first
difference yielded a 1.61% reduction in the probability of short sale, and a .52%
increase for REO.

Conclusion
This chapter set out to create a model that would aid in explaining the
consumer decision‐making process for borrowers facing mortgage default. The
extant literature has two competing hypotheses explaining default—the double
trigger hypothesis and strategic default. Proponents of double trigger hypothesis
argue that income shocks, in addition to underwater mortgages are the necessary
conditions for default. Strategic default, by contrast, argues that negative equity is
the necessary and sufficient condition for default; borrowers may do so ruthlessly,
or may take into account transaction costs before defaulting. The key distinction is
the borrower’s ability to pay their mortgage. The current literature focuses entirely
on foreclosure as the only possible outcome for a distressed borrower. By adding
short sales as another possible outcome for a distressed sale, we are better able to
differentiate the conditions under which borrowers are making strategic decisions.
The findings from the multinomial probit models validate the strategic
default hypothesis, while also refuting the double trigger hypothesis. In the baseline
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model, employment was shown to have a minimal impact on the predicted
probabilities and a different directional relationship for short sales and REO.
Income in both the baseline and interactive model had minimal impact on the
probability of short sale and a small impact on REOs. The fully specified model
further confirmed the findings from the baseline models; by looking at the impact of
income shocks at various price change levels, holding all other variables constant,
the impact was minimal at most price levels. Changes in price levels affected
changes in the predicted probability at all levels, as such, confirmed the strategic
default hypothesis that negative equity is a sufficient condition for default.
At the maximum income shock level, which is an outlier to the data, and at
high levels of price decrease there was a significant change in the predicted
probability of short sales and REO. This is an extreme condition, although an
important finding that at high levels of income and price decreases short sales are
more prevalent than REO. In the normal range of values between plus and minus
one standard deviation of income shock levels; the impact on the predicted
probability is less than 2% for either type of sale outcome. This is the caveat to the
double trigger hypothesis rejection, however it is does not provide compelling
evidence to support the theory.
In addition to looking at income shocks and price level changes, the fully
specified model also included other important variables identified in the literature.
The first of these “policy” variables was education level; it was found that in
neighborhoods with at least 65% of the population with a college degree,
foreclosure is more likely than short sale. The results were not consistent with the
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theory in the literature, as the predicted relationship was negative to default.
Education had a different directional relationship to the sales outcomes, with a
positive relationship to short sales and a negative relationship to foreclosure. Put
differently, higher levels of education increases the probability of short sale, but
reduces the probability of foreclosure. Holding all other variables at their mean, the
percentage of organic sales remained constant for the entire range of education
values.

This indicates a direct substitution in the borrower’s decision‐making

between short sale and foreclosure, which is an important finding for policy making.
An increase in education could be considered a Pareto improvement as it
encourages a positive outcome while not increasing the probability of REO.
Sales price of the individual property was found to be the variable affecting
the greatest first difference change for both short sales and REO. The findings are
consistent with the findings in the literature and with the theory presented earlier.
Agents are incentivized to list high priced properties, their incentives are further
increased due to the additional time and work attributed to short sales. For low
priced properties, agents may avoid marketing their services, as they don’t value the
compensation for the amount of work required. Another way to capture this would
be to research a sample of real estate agents that work in the location being studied.
Their marketing pieces or websites could be coded to see if they contain expressions
such as “short sale specialists” to capture if real estate agents are actively pushing
short sales in the area24.

24

See http://shortsalesellit.com/ for an example of a website in Los Angeles specifically targeting
short sales in their marketing
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Credit card debt was found to have the expected positive relationship to
default. In areas of high credit card debt, the probability for foreclosure increases
more than for short sales, conversely in areas of low credit card debt, the gap
between REO and short sale decreases. Credit card debt can be considered a proxy
for an income shortage; therefore the increased probability of REO compared to
short sale indicates that income shocks may have a less pronounced effect on
borrowers’ decision to select short sale. Borrowers who are acting strategically may
be able to afford their payments, or could possibly be attempting to conceal their
behavior from lender monitoring.
Borrowers living in neighborhoods with high levels of wealth are more likely
to have a foreclosure. The literature predicted that short sales would increase at
higher levels of wealth; this finding was not supported based on the findings in this
chapter. Possible reasons for the reduction in short sales could be borrowers fear of
bank recourse, or the demand for borrower contributions to close the sale. Banks
require borrowers to disclose their assets before approving short sales; at high
levels of wealth banks could refuse to approve the short sale, or they may demand
that the borrower contribute significantly to the equity short fall. California passed
new legislation in 2011 eliminating the ability of banks to require borrower
contributions in order to approve short sale25. An area for further study would be to
incorporate data from 2011 and beyond to see if the probability of short sale is
impacted based on the new lender requirements.

25

see section 580e ‐ http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi‐bin/displaycode?section=ccp&group=00001‐
01000&file=577‐582.5
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Homeowner stability was found to have a negative relationship to the
probability of distressed sales. The net effect of changing levels of homeowner
stability had little differentiation in the relative probabilities between short sale and
REO. These findings do not offer any substantial evidence to support or discredit
either of the two theories on default, nor do they offer any insight into creating
policy to encourage additional short sales.
Finally, owner occupancy rates for neighborhoods were found to have
minimal impact on differentiating a borrower’s decision on the type of default. The
findings show that owner occupancy has a positive impact on the amount of
distressed sales, however the relative impact of effecting a change in probability is
negligible as the difference between the outcomes remains similar for the entire
range of values. The current literature does not have a consensus as the expected
effects of owner occupancy. The findings in this study suggest that areas with more
investment properties are less likely to have distressed sales. This could be the
result of several factors, including that investor’s value an investment based on cash
flow, therefore a short run decrease in the price would not impact their long‐term
returns. Additionally, investors are more likely to use larger down payments than
owner‐occupants; therefore investors are more likely to have equity remaining
despite the general decline in market prices. Finally, investors would be less likely
to purchase real estate as the market experienced drastic increases, holding rents
constant, as prices increase the returns on investment decrease.
Based on the findings in the study, several public policies could be enacted to
help reduce the number of foreclosures, while also promoting short sale as a better
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alternative for a borrower in default. Income shocks were not shown to have a
major impact on strategic default, therefore loan modification programs focusing on
lowering borrower payments are unlikely to reduce the number of distressed sales.
Credit card debt was found to have a positive relationship to default, specifically
foreclosures, if this type of debt is considered to be a proxy for income shortfalls, a
program of payment deferment may be a better solution, without the moral hazard
associated with loan modification for all borrowers.
In neighborhoods with high levels of education, the probability of foreclosure
was less than short sales, holding all other variables at their mean value. Educating
borrowers in default to the benefits to short sale should be a main focus for lenders
and government programs. Currently, the government offers small incentives for
borrowers and lenders who choose short sale. Simplifying and streamlining the
short sale process for the borrower, in addition to offering larger incentives for
borrowers, could help induce the desired behavior. Another possible policy would
be to reduce the amount of time until a borrower is able to qualify for a government
backed loan after short sale. There is currently a great deal of uncertainty as to the
consequences of short sale, if the government can educate and incentivize
borrowers, it should lead to a reduction in foreclosure.
The results of an upward shift in education to 75% of the population with
college degrees and the sales price to $750,000, holding all other variables at their
mean, for the range of price decreases can be seen in figure 23. At the mean value
for price drop, the probability of REO is lower than short sale for the upward shift,
and also lower than the original mean value for short sales.
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Educating the

population and offering incentives to real estate agents to list lower price properties
could yield the optimal policy approach of reducing the number of foreclosures
while encourage additional short sales.

Figure 23 – Upward shift in Education effect on Predicted Probability of REO
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A final note on possible public policies would be to specifically target
neighborhoods with high percentages of minorities, specifically black populations,
with additional information on the benefits of short sale. The findings in this
chapter showed that in areas with large minority populations, borrowers were less
likely to short sale. Areas with large black populations are positively related to the
probability of REO, so additional attention should be given to reducing foreclosures
in those neighborhoods.
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Future studies would benefit from incorporating short sales into the analysis
when modeling distressed sales and strategic default. Surveys of borrowers who
have declared themselves as strategic defaulters do not exist, as consumers are
weary of divulging their true intent to lenders. As such, research design is key in
order to accurately measure borrower decision‐making.

Future studies where

individual mortgage data is paired with sales data would be better able measure
individual consumer decision‐making, rather than attempting to use neighborhood
level proxies. In addition, the methodology used in this study could be expanded to
other areas of the country to determine if the effects can be generalized to all areas.
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Chapter 3 –
Neighborhood Effects: Measuring Contagion and the Impact of Social
Stigma on Borrower Decision Making
“While strategic default is frequently a rational economic choice for underwater homeowners, if
rationality was the driving force, most strategic defaulters would walk away much sooner than they
actually do. Instead, most strategic defaulters don’t walk away until they are more than 50%
underwater” – White (2010)

Introduction
The previous chapter studied distressed homeowner decision‐making,
identifying key property and neighborhood level variables that influence the
borrower’s choice between foreclosure and short sale. An additional variable that
is often overlooked when trying to identify causal relationships is the factor that
spatial association can have on influencing an individual’s behavior.

This can

emerge in a variety of methods, but usually involves some type of contagion effect,
whereby the characteristics of an individual are observed and then influence other
individuals in neighboring locations. In the case of distressed sales, contagion
manifests

itself

in

two

main

behaviors—social

stigma

and

price

contamination/discount.
This chapter will focus on identifying any such social stigmas that may either
encourage or discourage borrowers decision‐making. Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales
(2009) found that when holding morality constant, people that knew somebody who
defaulted strategically were 82% more likely to also use the put option and
strategically default.

Homeowners that are living in an area saturated with

foreclosures and the resulting abandoned and neglected properties are likely to be
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influenced by the negative externalities. This chapter will seek to identify any
spatial associations using a variety of statistical techniques and measures. What
follows is a review of the literature and the resultant theories and methodology that
emerge based on this area of study. The chapter will then present the results and
findings from the various spatial statistical techniques employed.

Finally, the

chapter will conclude with a summary of the findings and implications for future
study.
Literature Review
In a 2008 speech, Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke noted “high rates of
foreclosure can have substantial spillover effects on the housing market, the
financial market and the broader economy”26.

Numerous studies have been

conducted to measure such “spillover” effects—these effects are often referred to as
contagion. Foreclosure contagion effects studies generally fall into two categories—
hedonic price models or spatial models. The majority of studies employ some form
of hedonic price models27. These models use the log of the house price as the
dependent variable, and then neighborhood and individual house characteristics as
the independent variables. To measure the contagion effect, they will include the
number of foreclosures within a specific distance as an additional independent
variable. An example of such a study would be Immergluck and Smith (2005), who
look at foreclosures in Chicago during 1997 and 1998. Their findings were that each
foreclosure within an eighth of a mile of a single‐family residence reduces the value

26

http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20080505a.htm
see Rosen, Sherwin (1974) for additional information on the methodology used in hedonic price
models

27
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by 0.9 percent. Chapter 3 will focus on identifying any possible price contagion
through the use of a hedonic price model, the remainder of this chapter will focus on
spatial dependence associated with social stigma.
A different approach to measuring contagion is to use spatial models rather
than hedonic price models. Schintler et. al analyzed New England28 using spatial
temporal data from January 2007 through March 2008, the unit of analysis is the
census tract level. Foreclosure contagion is defined as an “increase in neighborhood
foreclosures that spreads over time from neighborhood to adjoining neighborhood.”
This approach varies greatly from the hedonic price models; looking at
neighborhood trends, rather than individual price effects of foreclosures within
distances of under a quarter of a mile. Census tracts are coded as hot spots, cold
spots or transitory. Hot spots are areas of high foreclosures surrounded by other
tracts with high rate of foreclosure. Cold spots, conversely, are areas with low levels
of foreclosure surrounded by other tracts with low levels. Transitory tracts can be
low areas adjacent to high areas, or vice versa.
Schintler

et.

al

(2009)

used

Global

Moran’s

I

Statistic

(spatial

autocorrelation) to analyze contagion between census tracts. The spatial temporal
analysis showed that transitory neighborhoods (low to high and high to low)
increasingly become like the hot or cold spots in the adjacent tracts. Cold spots
exhibited the most growth of any of the categories over the time period examined.
The authors used rook first order contiguity to measure spatial association; the
connectivity used only measure tracts directly adjacent to the observed tract that
28

New England is comprised of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut
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are north, south, east or west (similar to a rook’s movements in chess). This
methodology has some drawbacks as it does not necessarily measure all of the
adjacent census tracts, it also does not account for varying distances. A large census
tract may have a neighbor that is several miles away from its center, while a small
tract may have adjoining tracts located within a 1000m radius. Each area of analysis
needs to be carefully considered so that the appropriate spatial association is used.
Can (1998) provides an overview of spatial analysis and the incorporation of
GIS, noting that “GIS technology provides the optimal environment for investigating
neighborhood effects in the housing and mortgage markets.” The author suggests a
two tier approach to spatial analysis; the exploratory spatial data analysis (ESDA),
followed by the confirmatory data analysis (CDA). In the ESDA, the goal is to
identify the spatial structure and distributional patterns. The goal of CDA is to
formally model the spatial association and quantify the strength of any
relationships. Spatial spillover effects can be both positive, neighbors maintaining
and improving their property, or negative when abandoned properties sit vacant for
long periods of time.
Another factor to consider when studying spatial association is the social
stigma created when a home defaults on their mortgage. Brent White summarizes
over 350 personal accounts of individuals who decided to strategically default,
describing some of the social stigmas associated with defaulting on a mortgage.
Using anecdotal evidence, White lists anxiety, fearfulness/uncertainty about ones
financial future, and the unwillingness of the government to provide helpful policy
solutions as driving factors for an individual’s action/inaction regarding the
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decision to default. White poses an interesting question—do homeowners act as
depicted in the strategic default literature, calculating the present value associated
with owning their home, and then decide whether it is in their best interest to
exercise the put option on their home. That is to say are homeowners’ rational
acting utility maximizers, or are they influenced by the behavior of surrounding
neighbors and acquaintances. White found that the elderly, the highly educated, and
those with high credit scores were the most likely to strategically default.
The first survey conducted regarding individuals’ thoughts on strategic
default was published by Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2009). Using data from the
Financial Trust Index (FTI)29, respondents were asked about their views on
mortgage default. They authors argue that it is difficult to study the decision to
strategically default, “because it is de facto an unobservable event.” There is no such
data set available that indicates which mortgage defaults were strategic, and which
ones were due to an income shock. Additionally, they found that when controlling
for changes in unemployment, mortgage delinquencies are highly sensitive to
decreases in home prices. Therefore, their finding was that “that people default
because of the size of their negative equity, not just because they cannot afford to
pay” (2009). While some studies have tried to combine information about credit
scores with mortgage default information30, borrowers are incentivized to try to
hide their true intentions so as to not alert the lender if they are not actually
suffering a financial hardship. No study to date has been able to directly survey

29

www.financialtrustindex.com ‐ compiled by the University of Chicago Booth School of Business
and the Kellogg School of Management at Northwestern University
30 See Wyman‐Experian (2009)
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individuals who defaulted on their mortgages to determine what percentage
defaulted strategically.
The FTI surveyed randomly selected homeowners from around the country,
asking if they believed strategically defaulting was immoral. They found that 81%
of all homeowners thought it was immoral. However, when the same respondents
were asked to answer the same question while hypothetically $100,000 underwater
on their mortgage, the percentage of people who thought it was immoral dropped to
57%. Ceteris Paribus, people who have been in their home for more than 5 years
were 78% less likely to default. In the overall sample, 26% of households knew
somebody who has defaulted, while 9% knew somebody who had defaulted
strategically. Finally, they confirmed the findings of previous studies on foreclosure
contagion, noticing a non‐linear relationship between the attitudes towards default
and the number of defaults within specific ZIP codes. That is to say, as the number
of foreclosures increased in a ZIP code, the attitude towards default increased by a
larger percentage, indicating that contagion could contribute towards the reduction
of any social stigmas.
Fannie Mae conducts their National Housing Survey quarterly, surveying the
general population of homeowners on a variety of issues, making distinctions for
those with mortgages and for underwater borrowers. The 3rd quarter 2011 survey
specifically focuses on the issue of default and strategic default; the study provides
additional insights on various demographic groups views on default. The survey
found that owners are more likely to consider default if they know somebody else
that defaults – 6% of owners who know a defaulter would consider default,
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compared to 3% for owners who do not know somebody that has defaulted. 54%
of underwater homeowners reported knowing somebody in their neighborhood
who has defaulted on their mortgage, the percentage drops to 41% for the general
population. According to the survey, underwater homeowners are also more likely
to know a strategic defaulter—28% compared to 20% of the general population.
Underwater homeowners reported that 30.9% of their gross income goes into their
first mortgage payment; the mean for all homeowners with a mortgage is 27.4%.
Social stigmas are often compared to diseases by the manner they spread
through contagion. When looking at the housing market bubble, Akerlof and Shiller
(2009) noted that confidence, or the lack thereof, may be as contagious as any
disease. They also point to “money illusion” in explaining the housing bubble—
people often remember the purchase price of their home from a long time ago, and
assume that it has grown in value. By not factoring in inflation, they often assume
huge gains and that housing is always a good investment. This line of thinking can
also lead to feedback loops, where speculative prices encourage economic growth,
which then reassures the growth, causing additional speculation.

These

“information cascades” are often referenced as causal effects for the forming of
bubbles, however, the same behavior occurs in the opposite as markets crash31.

31

For more information on information cascades or herd effects see Surowiecki, James (2004) The
Wisdom of Crowds: Why the Many Are Smarter Than the Few and How Collective Wisdom Shapes
Business, Economies, Societies and Nations or Bikhchandani, Sushil , Hirshleifer, David and Welch,
Ivo (1992) "A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades."
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 100, No. 5, pp. 992‐1026.
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Theory and Methodology
The first methodological decision that must be determined when measuring
spatial dependency is the type and scope of the spatial connectivity relationship.
The two methods that will be employed in this study are “queens” first order
connectivity and a strict distance band.

The queen’s connectivity allows for

adjoining neighboring census tracts in all directions to exert some spatial influence
on the observed tract. First order signifies that tracts that share a border are
included, second order would be tracts that do not only share a common border, but
also add on tracts that share a common neighbor. The second measure is a strict
distance band, whereby all tracts that fall within the given distance are included,
regardless if they share a border. A strict distance allows for a more consistent
application due to the varying sizes of census tracts within Los Angeles County.
Figure 24 Queen’s First Order Connectivity – Spatial Dependence
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Figure 24 is a histogram of the number of neighbors for all of the census
tracts using queens first order connectivity. The minimum number of neighboring
tracts is 1 (2 tracts) and the maximum is 26 (1 tract). The mean number of
neighbors is 6.41; the most observed connectivity is 6 neighbors, with 554 of 2054
(27%) tracts falling into this category. Queen’s first order is a more consistent
measure than rook’s connectivity, where only neighboring tracts directly north,
south, east and west are included.

In an ideal research design using queen’s

connectivity, there would be a consistent number of neighbors for all tracts. Los
Angeles County has census tracts of vastly different areas, therefore the use of a
strict distance makes more theoretical sense for this study based on the idea that
contagion occurs at the neighborhood level.

The number of neighbors isn’t

consistent, however, distance is more likely to influence consumer behavior than
unobserved geographical census tracts. Certain statistical analyses are limited to
the use of queen’s connectivity; when both methods are available, the results will be
compared.
Once the spatial relationship is established, there are several different
measures that can be used to identify any spatial associations. Morans Global I
measures the spatial association (spatial autocorrelation) of all of the census tracts
in the system. It is measured on a scale from ‐1 to 1, with 0 indicating no spatial
association, negative values indicate negative association and positive numbers
indicate positive association. A positive association indicates that values that
diverge from the mean (positive or negative) are clustering near each other, a
negative association indicates that higher than mean areas are located near lower
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than mean areas. It should be noted that Moran’s Global I values are unique to
particular systems, and values cannot be compared from one study to another with
a different geographic area of analysis.
As the title suggests, Moran’s Global I statistic looks at the entire system, and
then assigns a value, it does not distinguish between areas within the system, as
such it does not allow for narrower unit of analysis observation for specific areas
within the system. Anselin (1995, 2000) developed the Local Indicators of Spatial
Association (LISA) that allow for analysis of specific tracts within the global system.
He created 4 categories of local relationships, High‐High, (dark red on map) High‐
Low (light red), Low‐High (light blue), and Low‐Low (dark blue). In order for the
spatial association to be depicted on the maps the p‐values need to be statistically
significant at the .01% level. The LISA statistics used in the study use the queen’s
first order connectivity as the spatial reference.
Another local measure of spatial association that will be used in this chapter
is the Getis‐Ord‐Gi* statistic (Getis and Ord 1992).

This method is similar to

Anselin’s LISA statistic in that they both identify clusters of hot and cold spots. For
the Getis‐Ord‐Gi* statistic, the spatial reference used was a fixed distance of 3000m.
Global Moran’s I statistics were used at fixed distances of 1000m, 2000m, and
3000m to determine which distance had the highest z score; 3000m was more
significant than the other distances. Distances of more than 3000m were not
considered for this study, as the goal was to identify neighborhood effects. The
results for the Getis‐Ord‐Gi* are reported in terms of their standard deviations; Hot
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or Cold spots are identified for tracts that are more than 2.58 standard deviations
away from the mean.
Based on the spatial foreclosure literature (Schintler et. al 2009), it is
expected that evidence of spatial contagion will be present in this study for both
REO and short sales. The findings from the spatial literature are supported by the
findings of the Financial Trust Index (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2009) where
they found that borrowers were more likely to default if they knew somebody who
has defaulted. Social stigma is a difficult phenomena to capture, however, spatial
contagion is a good proxy as it shows that based on location, an observed event is
being influenced by the surrounding area. Both short sales and REO will be tested to
determine if contagion is occurring using global and local indicators.
The two main types of spatial dependence that emerge are spatial error and
spatial lag (Anselin 2005). Spatial error indicates that error terms across different
spatial units are correlated, which would indicate that covariates could be omitted
which would affect the inference in the model. Spatial lag still has the problem of
correlated error terms, but also violates the assumption of independent
observations. The spatial lag is present when the dependent variable in location i is
affected by independent variables in location i and also in location j. The spatial
analysis software GeoDa32 will be used to test for the presence of spatial lag and
spatial error.

32

See http://geodacenter.asu.edu/ for more information and to download the software.
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Findings and Analysis
The first aspect of spatial dependence to be evaluated will be to study the
emergence and any possible subsequent contagion of distressed sales. Figure 25
shows the average percent of short sales33 in each census tract from 2008 through
2010. It is clear that there are clusters of both high and low areas for short sales. Of
the 2054 census tracts in Los Angeles County, 52 had no short sales during the
period of study. The maximum percentage of short sales within a census tract was
.75%, six tracts had a percentage of greater than 50%, while 610 tracts (30% of the
total sample) had less than 10% of the total being short sales.
Figure 25 Short Sale Percentage Heat Map 200810
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Other possible sales outcomes in this study are an organic (non‐distressed) or REO (bank owned
distressed sale)
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Figure 26 represents the heat map for the percentage of REO sales in each
census tract for period of 2008 through 2010. During the period of study, 18 census
tracts did not have any REO sales, while one tract had only 1 sale and it was an REO.
The number of tracts with 50% or more of the sales being REOs was much larger
than for short sales (235 vs. 6), while 307 tracts had less than 10% of the sales
outcomes being foreclosures, which was half as many as for short sales (610). It is
clear that there are more higher and lower concentration tracts for REOs compared
to short sales, further analysis needs to be conducted to see if these areas are
clustering or are randomly distributed.
Figure 26 REO Percentage Heat Map 200810
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Figure 27 – Direction of Sale Type Change by Census Tract 20082010
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The complete breakdown of the annual percentage change of sale type at the
census tract level is presented in figure 27. The number of tracts with a repeat sale
increases for each year of the sample for both distressed sales outcomes. Similarly
for short sales and REO, the absolute number of tracts that showed a decreased
percentage of the total sales from the previous year increased throughout the
sample years. For each subsequent year in the sample, there were more tracts that
had a lower percentage of short sales/REO than the previous year. This indicates
the creation of cold spots where distressed sales are not growing in number.
Additionally, because the total percentage of distressed sales grows throughout the
sample, it indicates that where short sales and foreclosures are occurring they are
also growing in number, also known as a hot spot.
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Figure 28 – Short Sale Heat Map – Percentage change from 2007 to 2008
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Figure 29 – Short Sale Heat Map – percentage change from 2008 to 2009
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Figure 30 – Short Sale Heat Map – percentage change from 2009 to 2010

Short Sales - Sale Percent Change from 2009 to 2010

Legend
Ratio 2010/2009
0.000000000 - 1.000

!

1.001 - 2.000
2.001 - 4.000
4.001 - 6.000
6.001 - 8.000
Missing Value

0 2.5 5

10

15

Miles
20

In order to determine if contagion of distressed sales is present, a time series
approach must be taken to see if the clusters occurred organically, or emerged
centered around the initial occurrence of the phenomena. Figures 28 through 30
depict the annual change in the percent of short sales for each census tract. Missing
values occur when there are no observances of short sale for either or both of the
years represented in the map. The dark blue areas represent tracts where there
was a decrease in the percentage of sales from the previous year; all other colors
indicate an increase in the percentage over the previous year.

In total the

percentage break down is fairly consistent throughout the three years, ranging
between 30% and 38% of tracts decreasing from the previous year.

78

Figure 31 – REO Heat Map – percentage change from 2007 to 2008
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Figure 32 – REO Heat Map – percentage change from 2008 to 2009
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Figure 33 – REO Heat Map – percentage change from 2009 to 2010
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A similar heat map approach was taken for REO for the years between 2008
and 2010, however, the results differ significantly (see figures 31‐33). The percent
of tracts that decreased from the previous year rose steadily throughout the sample;
starting at 10% in 2008, growing to 36% in 2009, and ending at 75% in 2010. It is
more difficult to visually identify hot and cold spots for REO as the general trend is
more similar for the entire system. Figure 34 displays the Moran’s I coefficients for
the entire county using queen’s first order contiguity, all the values were positive
which indicate the observations are more clustered than would be randomly
predicted. For short sales the Moran’s I value increases for each successive year in
the sample, while for REO, the peak value was in 2009. Taking a cross‐sectional
approach for the entire sample yields the higher Moran’s I values than for the
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individual years; the values for REO are higher for all categories than short sales,
which indicates that clustering is more likely for foreclosures.
Figure 34 – Global Moran’s I Los Angeles County Census Tracts 20082010
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In order to determine statistically significant clusters, the Local Indicators of
Spatial Association (LISA) developed by Anselin (1995, 2000) were used to look at
how the previous year influenced the occurrence of short sales in the following year.
LISA uses first order queen’s contiguity, and reports findings that are statistically
significant at the .01% level for the four categories of possible relationships. Figure
35 displays the three year time series from 2008 to 2010. As can be seen, clusters of
High‐High and Low‐Low develop over time; this is consistent with the global
Moran’s I values which also increased for each year of the sample.
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Figure 35 – Short Sale LISA Cluster Map Time Series for 20072010
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Figure 36  LISA Cluster Map Time Series for 20072010
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Figure 36 presents the same time series of LISA for REO for the years 2008
through 2010. Clusters of both High‐High and Low‐Low emerge in 2008, then
continue to strengthen for 2009 and 2010. The global Moran’s I value increases
from 2008 to 2009, then decreases slightly in 2010. Despite the global decrease, the
local systems of clusters remain statistically significant, this is indicative of social
contagion occurring, as local neighborhoods remain significant while the global
system becomes slightly less clustered.
Figure 37 Short Sale Hot and Cold Spots – 20072010
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The next section uses the Getis‐Ord‐Gi* statistic as an alternative approach to
measuring local spatial contagion (Getis and Ord 1992). This methodology uses the
fixed distance band rather than contiguity as the measure for spatial reference. The
distance used was 3000m, which means that the central location of any census tract
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within 3000m is considered to have some spatial association. A cross sectional
approach was taken for both short sales (se figure 37) and REO (see figure 38), the
results confirm the findings using the LISA methodology that clusters of hot and
cold spots emerge for both short sales and REO.
Figure 38 REO Hot and Cold Spots – 20072010
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The final test of spatial dependence was to determine the presence of spatial
errors and lags. Using GeoDa, an OLS regression was run using both short sale and
REO as the dependent variables to establish a baseline. The independent variables
were the same as identified in chapter 2 as specified by the literature review. The
purpose of the methodology is not necessarily to attempt to construct a model that
identifies the determinants of short sales and REO, but rather to establish if any type
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of spatial dependence is present. Based on the OLS model results, five tests for
spatial dependence were run; Lagrange Multiplier (LM) to test for spatial error, LM
for spatial lag, Robust LM for spatial error, Robust LM for spatial error, and an LM
spatial auto‐regressive moving average (SARMA).
Table 5 – Diagnostics for Spatial Dependence  Short Sales and REO
Spatial Dependence Test
LM - Spatial Lag
Robust LM - Spatial Lag
LM - Spatial Error
Robust LM- Spatial Error
LM - SARMA
N
Adjusted R-Squared
Log likelihood

Short Sale
*
*
*

REO

*

*
*
*
**
*

2054
0.2148
1827

2054
0.6253
2600

LM = Lagrange Multiplier
*** p <0.10, **p <0.05, *p<.01

The spatial dependence tests were all statistically significant at the .01% for
short sales except for the Robust LM test for spatial error, which indicates that
spatial lag is not statistically significant when the error term for the dependent
variable is present. The diagnostics for spatial dependence were also observed to be
statistically significant at the .01% level for REO, except for Robust LM for spatial
error which was statistically significant at the .05% level. The individual spatial lag
and error terms were both statistically significant, therefore neither phenomena can
be discounted; separate models for each were run to determine which association is
more likely to describe the relationship.
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Table 6 – Spatial Regression Model Results for Short Sales and REO

LAMDA

Error

Lag

Short Sale

Short Sale

Income Shock

Interactive (P & I)

Sales Price

Lag

REO

REO

0.2*

.1955*

(.035)

(.0356)

Weighted Dependent

Price Change

Error

.2013*

.145*

(.032)

(.025)

.1081*

.106*

-.412*

-.411*

(.0196)

(.0195)

(.0286)

(.0285)

-.00000071*

-.00000067*

.0000012*

.0000012*

(.0000003)

(.0000002)

(.00000034)

(.00000034)

-.00000061*

-.000006*

.0000028**

.0000031*

(.000000023)

(.0000008)

(.000000034)

(.0000012)

-.000000005*

-.0000006*

-.0000001*

-.0000001*

(.000000007)

(.000000007)

(.000000011)

(.00000011)

Education

Credit Card Debt

Net Worth

Stability

Owner Occupancy

Age

Asian

Hispanic

Black

Constant

-.0014*

-.0013*

-.0028*

-.0027*

(.000029)

(.00028)

(.0004)

(.0004)

0.000021

0.000018

-.00044*

-.00046*

(.00011)

(.00011)

(.000016)

(.00016)

-.000000004

-.000000002

-.00000001

-.00000001

(.000000018)

(.000000018)

(.00000002)

(.0000002)

-.0015*

-.0015*

-.0032*

-.0032*

(.00023)

(.00023)

(.00034)

(.00033)

.00088*

.00084*

.002*

.002*

(.00014)

(.00014)

(.0002)

(.0002)

-.0011*

-.0011*

-.0032*

-.0031*

(.000041)

(.0004)

(.00059)

(.00059)

0.00019

0.00017

0.000076

0.000065

(.00013)

(.00013)

(.00019)

(.00019)

-.000068

-.000084

.001*

.001*

(.00011)

(.00011)

(.00016)

(.00015)

-.00051*

-.00047*

.0015*

.0014*

(.00013)

(.00012)

(.00018)

(.00018)

.2549*

.2255*

.321*

.2813*

(.0168)

(.0317)

(.0245)

(.0251)

N

2054

2054

2054

2054

R-Squared

0.236

0.241

0.633

0.634

Log Likelihood
Standard errors in parentheses

2616

2621
1842
*** p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *p<0.01
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Results from the OLS models for short sales and REO were re‐estimated
using the maximum likelihood approach while controlling for spatial error, and then
spatial lags (see table 6). For the spatial error model a LAMBA variable was added
to represent the spatially correlated errors. In order to control for spatial lag, a
weighted variable W_short_sale or W_REO was added to control for the influence
neighboring tracts have on observations. The spatial lag models were found to be
better fits as they increased the R‐squared and log likelihood more than the spatial
error controls. Both of the REO models had higher r‐squared values than the short
sale models, however the W_ coefficient for short sales had a larger magnitude. In
both cases the additional lag variable was positive and statistically significant at the
.01% level.

Conclusion
This chapter set out to identify any underlying spatial associations that may
impact the contagion of short sales and REO. The goal was to identify phenomena
not captured by demographic or economic variables that influence distressed
homeowner decision‐making through the imposing or reduction of social stigmas
associated with default. Two methods of spatial reference were employed in the
chapter—first order queen’s connectivity and a 3000m fixed distance band.
Although theoretical evidence exists to suggest that a fixed distance band is a more
appropriate measure given the spatial configuration of Los Angeles County, the
results were similar for both spatial references where they could be used to
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measure similar variables. Therefore all of the findings in the chapter are given
equal weighting regardless of the spatial reference used.
The first spatial analysis conducted was the use of heat maps to display the
different distribution of sales outcomes. The number of tracts with a recorded short
sale or REO increased for each year of the study. Both distressed sales outcomes
had an increasing number of tracts that showed a negative year over year change,
although REO had a larger percentage of tracts with a reduction in percentage of
sales from the previous year. Short sales had a range of between 30% and 38% of
tracts having a decreased sales percent from the previous year; the same measure
for REO had a range of between 36% and 75%. Given the increase in mean
percentage for distressed sales, this indicates a consolidation of observations into
hot and cold spots.
Global Moran’s I values were taken for the entire system for each of the years
in the sample, as well as a pooled data set. The results showed that positive spatial
association was statistically significant at the .01% level, which indicates
observations are more clustered than would be randomly predicted. The degree of
global system spatial association increased for each year in the sample for short
sales, and was highest in 2009 for REO. The pooled data set had higher Global
Moran’s I values respectively than any individual year in the sample.
In order to identify individual neighborhood effects, the use of local
indicators were used to measure spatial association. LISA and the Getis‐Ord‐Gi*
measures both identified the emergence of hot and cold clusters for short sales and
REO. There were more observed hot and cold spots for REO than for short sales,
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although in some cases individual tracts were represented as a hot or cold spot for
both distressed sales outcomes.
The final analysis conducted was to construct baseline OLS models, then test
for the observance of either spatial errors or lags. The diagnostics indicated that
both spatial error and lags could be present, although the robust test for spatial
error was not statistically significant for short sales and significant at the .05% level
for REO. These findings indicate that the spatial lag is not statistically significant
when the error term for the dependent variable is added. In order to confirm which
type of spatial association is most likely present, the OLS models were re‐estimated
using the maximum likelihood approach with specific controls for spatial error and
lag. In both distressed sales outcomes, it was found that spatial lag was a better fit,
therefore the more likely spatial association for the system.
The implications for all the spatial diagnostics that were employed are
clear—there is positive spatial association for both short sales and REO.

Put

differently, clusters of high or low percentages of distressed sales form that are
statistically different than would be randomly formed. These clusters are observed
whether using a time series or pooled approach and either of the two spatial
reference methodologies.

These clusters are unobserved by other traditional

statistical measures, and represent social stigma that impact the decision‐making of
borrowers who are in default on their mortgage. These stigmas can have either a
positive or negative effect on the emergence of a particular behavior.
The policy implications that emerge from this analysis are that localized
policies should be enacted targeting specific neighborhoods. If positive actions can
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be taken to increase the social stigma associated with REO, and decrease the social
stigma surrounding short sales, contagion can be controlled in an optimal manner.
Studies that do not study neighborhood effects do not have the ability to capture
spatial dependence. Units of analysis at the zip‐code, city or MSA levels cannot
capture or account for the spatial association, as such their findings will be biased.
Future studies can be improved by selecting census tract level data that can
benefit from the use of spatial statistical analysis. Unfortunately, the incorporation
of spatial association controls is not easily implemented for all types of research
design. The majority of the literature on contagion of distressed sales focuses
entirely on price contagion, specifically on REO price discount.

This chapter

contributes to the literature by adding short sales to the contagion framework, and
also by looking at contagion as it impacts the decision‐making, rather than simply
the price effects. Price contagion effects are certainly an important measure to
understand, and will be explored in the subsequent chapter; however
understanding how the behavior is transmitted allows for policies targeting the
undesired externalities. Identifying a price discount should be a secondary concern;
if the undesired REO outcome can be reduced through effective policy, the impact of
the price discount becomes less relevant.
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Chapter 4 –
Distressed Sales Market Impact: Evaluating Price Contagion of REO
vs. Short Sales
“An abandoned property resulting from foreclosure in a neighborhood acts as a catalyst by reducing the
expected return on investment on surrounding properties. Homeowners and investors adjacent to
abandoned or vacant properties are less likely to invest because of the anticipated spillover effects of
these properties on the value of their property. This will start the familiar self fulfilling prophecy of less
investment, leading to lower quality, lower demand, lower price, higher LTV, and finally foreclosure and
abandonment.” Can (1998)

Introduction
The main mechanism through which distressed sales have a negative impact
on the economy is through a price reduction contagion. Results from the first
chapter identified key variables that effect distressed borrower decision‐making.
The second chapter identified spatial associations that were not observed in the first
chapter that also impact decision making through the contagion of social stigmas
that can positively or negatively promote behavior. Understanding the effect REOs
compared to short sales have on neighborhood property values provides the final
piece to understanding the impact distressed sales have on the economy. If the
price discount is found to be the same for short sales compared to REO, the
implications for promoting short sales as a preferred outcome become less clear. By
contrast, if as predicted, short sales have less of an impact on neighborhood prices—
the findings from the first two chapters become relevant for generating policies
aimed at the reduction of foreclosures while promoting short sales as the preferred
outcome.
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The remainder of the chapter begins with a review of the extant literature on
distressed sales price contagion. The main contribution of this chapter is adding
short sales to the analysis of the price contagion models. The next section outlines
the methodology employed to model the impact of distressed sales on neighborhood
pricing. Results of the model are presented and then summarized to conclude the
chapter.
Literature Review
The most used methodology to capture price contagion for foreclosures is the
hedonic price model, where the dependent variable is the sales price and the
independent variables are comprised of individual property attributes and
neighborhood quality measures.

An oft‐cited paper by Immergluck and Smith

(2005) outlines the basic methodology of the hedonic price model for a sample of
9,600 single‐family properties in Chicago from 1997 to 1998. In their study they
include concentric circles of one–eighth and a quarter mile around each foreclosure
as explanatory variables, along with census tract level control variables. For every
foreclosure within one‐eighth of a mile, there was a negative price effect of .09%, the
relationship was also negative for a quarter mile, however, the results were not
statistically significant.
Recent studies have added to the hedonic price model methodology,
Leonard and Murdoch (2009) study the effect foreclosures have on neighborhood
quality. A foreclosure can be seen as a “nonpecuniary externality,” as it reduces the
quality of the neighborhood, which can be seen as a local public good. In their
model, they create rings of 250, 500, 1000, and 1500 feet around each foreclosure to
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measure the spatial reach of the contagion. The list of control variables they used to
measure neighborhood effects were: minority populations, population over 65,
owner occupancy rate and school district.

Overall, they found the effect of a

foreclosure within 250 feet to be .5%, this dropped to be almost negligible at over
1000 ft. One difference in their methodology was the use of any stage of the
foreclosure process as a signal of decreased neighborhood quality—this is different
than only looking at the auction date or the sale of the REO by the bank as the
observed data point.
Harding, Rosenblatt, and Yao (2009) contribute to the literature by looking at
repeat sales transactions—this research design allows them to better control for the
overall changes in market prices and to measure more accurately the impact of
foreclosures. By looking at all 3 stages of foreclosure—pre‐foreclosure, auction, and
REO sale—this study was able to identify the varying degrees of contagion during
the foreclosure process. They found contagion effects present up to one year before
the REO sale, but found the largest effect on price to be at the REO sale date. A
single foreclosure has an impact of 1% decline in value for homes within 300 feet.
On average, they found that the REO sale occurred 10 months after the lender took
possession of the property.
Another example of research design to capture foreclosure price contagion
was used by Rauterkus et al (2009) in their study of the Chicago market from 2003
to 2008.

They used zip code as the unit of analysis and theorized that

neighborhoods with low foreclosure rates (as a percentage of total sales) would
have a greater price gap. This so called “REO discount” would have the opposite
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effect in areas with high rate of REO sales, where the authors argue that the entire
market will become contaminated and thus less sensitive to a price gap for REO
sales. An additional hypothesis advanced was that a tipping point would occur
where there would be a reversal of the REO discount once a saturation level was
reached. Their results confirmed the hypothesis of a large REO discount for areas
with low foreclosures rates, and vice verse for areas with high rates. The findings
did not confirm the theory on the emergence of a tipping point where the rate of
change for the REO discount would reverse directions.

Theory and Methodology
The methodology used for this chapter will be a hedonic price model, where
the sales price is the dependent variable and a variety of property specific variables
are used as the independent variables. Sales price is not normally distributed, the
data reflects a better fit in log form, therefore the sales price was log transformed
and then used as the dependant variable (see figure 39). All of the data was
aggregated by year at the census tract unit of analysis; the data will be modeled in
panel form for the years 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010 for the 2054 census tracts in
Los Angeles County. Although price contamination effects are likely present for the
various stages leading up to the creation of an REO, Harding, Rosenblatt, and Yao
(2009) found the largest effect to be present at the date of REO sale. As such, in
order to capture the largest effect, lagged variables measuring REO were not used.
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Figure 39 – Sales Price Distribution Transformation

The descriptive statistics for the number of distressed sales are displayed in
table 6 for the years 2007 through 2010.

Rather than using the percent of

distressed sales to capture the price contagion, the number of short sales and REO
sales were used. The theoretical reason for doing so is due to the distribution of the
sample of sales; when there are low occurrences of distressed sales, the percentages
can be skewed and lead to severely misspecified model results. For example, in
2007 the mean value for REO sales was .71, the effect of 1 REO in a tract with 10
total sales compared to a tract with 100 sales would yield vastly different
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implications if the percentage of sales were used. The problem with using sale
counts as opposed to sales percentage is that when the number of sales is high, the
opposite problem of bias would occur as with small samples.
For the four years in the sample there were 7970 out of a possible 8216
tracts that had at least one sale during the observed year, the 245 omitted variables
were for tracts that had no sales. Tracts that had 10 or less short sales accounted
for 93.5% of the sample, and tracts with 20 or less accounted for 99.25%. There
were only 60 tracts that had more than 20 short sales in a given year. For REO, 79%
of the census tracts had 10 or less sales, while 93.25% had 20 or less. There were
537 tracts that had more than 20 REO in a given year. Given the low number of
tracts that had high counts for short sales or REO, the methodology of using the
number of sales compared to percentage is the preferred measure.
Table 6 – Descriptive Statistics for Sales Type (count) 20072010
Variable
Short Sales -2007
REO - 2007

N
1972
1972

Mean
0.58
0.72

Std. Dev
1.07
1.11

Short Sales -2008
REO - 2008

1969
1969

2.45
7.17

Short Sales - 2009
REO - 2009

1985
1985

Short Sales - 2010
REO - 2010

2044
2044

Min

Max
0
0

11
9

3.26
8.25

0
0

34
89

4.39
11.16

5.05
11.58

0
0

68
83

5.79
6.98

4.64
5.26

0
0

38
37

Table 7 contains the descriptive statistics for the three possible sales
outcomes for a variety of sales price variables. For both sales price and price per
square foot variables, it is clear that there is a large difference for both short sales
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and REO. The difference in mean values for short sales compared to organic sales is
26% for sales price and 19% on a price per square foot basis. The difference is of a
larger magnitude for REO compared to organic sales, with mean sales prices being
33% lower and price per square foot 24% less. These values do not necessarily
represent the price discount or stigma associated with distressed sales, but rather a
lower quality of product for distressed sales compared to organic sales.
Table 7 – Descriptive Statistics for Sales Price 20072010
Variable
Organic Sales (%)
Short Sales (%)
REO (%)

N
7970
7970
7970

Mean
0.67
0.11
0.23

Std. Dev
0.27
0.11
0.22

All Price per Sq. Ft.
Organic Price per Sq. Ft.
Short Sale Price per Sq. Ft.
REO Price per Sq. Ft.

7970
7848
5570
6302

316
331
267
251

All - Sales Price
Organic - Sales Price
Short Sale - Sales Price
REO - Sales Price

7970
7848
5570
6302

All - List Price
Organic - List Price
Short Sale - List Price
REO - List Price
Organic - List Price Discount
Short Sale - List Price
Discount
REO - List Price Discount

Min

Max
0
0
0

1
1
1

135
135
105
99

37
53
38.5
31

1635
2019
1970
1485

507611
540928
399175
362244

410134
426857
247897
248307

43800
50000
32000
44000

6883914
6883914
6500000
9700000

7970
7848
5570
6302

548593
585652
447337
381014

467401
490264
293893
248074

54425
50000
32144
55000

7847846
7847846
6995000
7500000

7848

0.06

0.06

-1.02

0.54

5570
6302

0.08
0.04

11
0.08

-0.69
-0.88

0.62
0.58

On average the price reduction from list price to sale price was greatest for
short sales and smallest for REO. This is likely due to the vastly different objectives
and incentives of the seller. REOs are bank owned, therefore the goal is to sell the
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property as quickly as possible to recapture the capital and put it back to productive
use; as such, the properties are priced competitively to sell as quickly as possible.
Short sales often start priced at a level of where the seller can cover the amount
owed on their mortgage.

Once the market determines that this price is not

achievable, the price is lowered, often times substantially. The goal of the owner
shifts to simply obtaining an offer to submit to the bank for short sale approval.
Owners of properties listed for short sale have no incentive to achieve a higher
price for the property since they will receive no proceeds from escrow. Lenders are
incentivized to take lower than market prices, as the alternative is to foreclose at a
substantial cost, then have to disposition the property as an REO that often incurs
additional repair costs.
The results in table 7 demonstrated a large gap in pricing between distressed
and organic sales, the descriptive statistics in table 8 indicate this is largely due to a
noticeable difference in quality of the various categories of sale. The first category is
not a measure of quality, but simply how many days on average a property is on the
market. As predicted by the theory, short sales take the longest to close, and REO
the shortest. Due to the nature of the negotiation with the lenders, short sales take
the longest to close, conversely, REO are priced with the intention of selling quickly.
The data demonstrates that this is case, with REO taking on average almost a third
less days on the market to sell compared to short sales. The other measures of
quality (square footage, bathrooms, bedrooms, and lot size) are all consistently
ordered; organic sales are observed with the highest measure of quality, short sale
the middle, and REO the lowest. When looking at the year built, the results do not
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conclusively show any difference between the three categories of sale, the difference
in means is less than three years between the categories.

Table 8 – Descriptive Statistics for Property Detail Variables 20072010
Variable
All - Days on the Market
Organic - DOM
Short Sale - DOM
REO - DOM

N
7970
7848
5570
6302

Mean
77
77
123
52

Std. Dev
28
35
65
37

All - Square Feet
Organic - Square Feet
Short Sale - Square Feet
REO - Square Feet

7970
7848
5570
6302

1562
1593
1516
1462

All - Bathrooms
Organic - Bathrooms
Short Sale - Bathrooms
REO - Bathrooms

7970
7848
5570
6302

All - Bedrooms
Organic - Bedrooms
Short Sale - Bedrooms
REO - Bedrooms

Min

Max
0
0
0
0

512
522
551
1140

524
554
564
534

377
377
377
377

6889
6889
8571
8484

2.08
2.11
2.1
2.01

0.58
0.61
0.82
0.65

0
0
0
0

7
7
33
8

7970
7848
5570
6302

2.93
2.96
2.95
2.85

0.56
0.6
0.73
0.67

0
0
0
0

10
10
8
6

All - Lot Size
Organic - Lot Size
Short Sale - Lot Size
REO - Lot Size

7970
7848
5570
6302

42329
59249
35534
21290

976230
1598790
1776642
852613

0
0
0
0

4800000
8920000
132000000
65000000

All - Year Built
Organic -Year Built
Short Sale - Year Built
REO - Year Built

7968
7846
5559
6300

1958
1958
1960
1957

19
19
20
20

1889
1889
1880
1890

2009
2010
2009
2008

The advantage to the use of panel data is the ability to control for unobserved
heterogeneity of the various census tracts. The model is controlled for fixed effects
at the tract level, and the standard errors are clustered at the tract level. The
equation used in the study is represented by equation (1):
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yit = xitb + ai + uit

(1)

yit = log sale price of census tracti at timet
xit = time varying characteristics at timet
ai = unobserved census tract effects
uit= error term
The variables used to capture the time varying characteristics are found in
Table 9 of the following section.
Findings and Analysis
Results from the model based on equation (1) are presented in table 9, the
coefficients represent a percentage change rather than a unit change due to the log
transformation of the independent variable. A hausman test was conducted to
determine if random effects or fixed effects were present; the results rejected the
null hypothesis of random effects, therefore fixed effects were used to capture the
unobserved effects. For every REO within a census tract, there is an expected price
discount of 1.7%. The REO discount is almost three times larger than the .468%
discount associated with each short sale. In general, the property‐specific details
had more of an impact on sales price than did neighborhood quality controls.
The main driver of sales price is the square footage of a property; every
additional square foot leads to a .05% increase in price. As would be expected,
additional bathrooms have a positive impact on pricing, adding 6.5% to the sales
price for each unit. An interesting finding was that bedrooms do not add additional
value; holding square footage constant, adding an additional bedroom reduces the
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sales price by 6.2 percent. Intuitively this makes sense, as buyers value the size of
the rooms more than the number of rooms. The vast majority of Los Angeles County
is urban; therefore lot sizes are generally small and similar across a broad range of
prices. Lot size did have a positive impact on sales price ceteris paribus, however, it
was not statistically significant. Similarly, the year built for the sales in a census
tract was not statistically significant, it also did not have any substantial effect on
the sales price in the census tract.
Table 9 –Hedonic Price Mode Results –Los Angels County Sales 200710
Log Sales Price
Sq. Ft. Total

.000595*
(.000035)

Short Sale (#)

-0.0047*
(.0011)

REO (#)

0.0171*
(.00059)

Bathrooms

0.0658*
(.0209)

Bedrooms

-0.0623*
(.0194)

Lot Size

0.000000003
(.000000002)

Year Built

-0.00056
(.0005)

Rent

-0.00128*
(.00015)

College

-0.0289*
(.0097)

Income

-0.000005**
(.0000002)

Owner Occupancy

0.0028
(.0032)

Constant

15.23*
(1.01)

N observations

7968

R-Squared

0.56

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *p<0.01
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Conclusion
The objective of this chapter was to identify the price discount associated
with both short sales and REO.

Price discount is the impact that individual

distressed sales have on the sales prices of other properties; in this case the unit of
analysis was the census tract. The first finding that emerged from the data was the
clear difference in quality that separated the three possible sales outcomes. Organic
sales had the highest sales price, but this was due to the higher quality associated
than category of sale. They had the largest square footage, the most bedrooms and
bathrooms and the largest lot size. Short sales were the second highest in the
preceding variables listed, while REO had the lowest in all of the categories.
The second finding was the short sales on average had the most days on the
market prior to closing the sale, and also the largest price decrease from the listing
price. REO had the lowest price drop and also fewest days on the market. These
findings are intuitive given the incentive structure for the sellers of each type of
property.

Individual property level time varying characteristics had a greater

impact than the neighborhood quality measures.
The important finding of the chapter was that short sales had almost three
times less of a price discount compared to REO. Each additional short sale has an
average a .47% reduction on sales in the same census tract, for REO the impact is
1.7%. Both of these coefficients were statistically significant at the .01% level while
controlling for fixed effects in the panel regression.
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Chapter 5 –
Conclusion
This dissertation focuses on mortgage defaults in Southern California during
the housing bubble of the 2000s. The rapid decline in the housing market that
precipitated the current recession has been accompanied by an unprecedented
number of loan defaults and foreclosures. Recent studies have identified two major
theories of default—the “double trigger” hypothesis, where negative equity and an
income shock are necessary conditions for default—and “strategic default” where
negative equity is a sufficient condition for default. The literature on default focuses
exclusively on foreclosure and the outcome of mortgage default—it therefore
follows that all the implications and policy advice is solely focused on foreclosure.
The area of focus for this study was Los Angeles County, where every closed
sale from 2007 to 2010 was coded into three possible sales outcomes: 1) Organic 2)
Short Sale 3) Real Estate Owned (REO). In doing so, another possible outcome for
default—short sale—was added to the analysis. Short sales represent 14% of all
sales in the sample, compared to 28% for REOs; omitting short sales as another
outcome eliminates a significant portion of all distressed sales from the analysis of
mortgage default. Chapter 2 created a multinomial probit model to understand the
important variables for borrowers who default on their mortgage; the dependent
variable is sales outcome, based on the three categories outlined above.
The findings from the multinomial probit models validate the strategic
default hypothesis, while also refuting the double trigger hypothesis. In the baseline
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model, employment was shown to have a minimal impact on the predicted
probabilities and a different directional relationship for short sales and REO.
Income in both the baseline and interactive models had minimal impact on the
probability of short sale and a small impact on REOs. The fully specified model
further confirmed the findings from the baseline models; by looking at the impact of
income shocks at various price change levels, holding all other variables constant,
the impact was minimal at all but extremely high‐income levels. Changes in price
levels affected changes in the predicted probability at all levels, therefore
confirming the strategic default hypothesis that negative equity is a sufficient
condition for default.
In addition to looking at income shocks and price level changes, the fully
specified model also included other important variables identified in the literature.
The first of these “policy” variables was education level; it was found that in
neighborhoods with at least 65% of the population with a college degree, short sale
is more likely than foreclosure. The results were not consistent with the theory in
the literature, as the predicted relationship was negative to default. Education had a
different directional relationship to the sales outcomes, with a positive relationship
to short sales and a negative relationship to foreclosure. Holding all other variables
at their mean, the percentage of organic sales remained constant for the entire
range of education values. This indicates a direct substitution in the borrower’s
decision‐making between short sale and foreclosure, which is an important finding
for policy making.
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Sale price of the individual property was found to be the variable affecting
the greatest first difference change for both short sales and REO. The findings are
consistent with the findings in the literature and with the theory presented earlier.
Real Estate agents are incentivized to list high priced properties, their incentives are
further increased due to the additional time and work attributed to short sales.
Chapter 3 focused on identifying any spatial association present for short
sales and REO, these effects are unobserved by traditional statistical measures, so
add to the literature on mortgage default. Contagion of distressed sales can emerge
via social constraints that effect borrower behavior. These social stigmas can either
promote or discourage either type out distressed sale outcome. Two methods of
spatial reference were employed in the chapter—first order queen’s connectivity
and a 3000m fixed distance band. Although theoretical evidence exists to suggest
that a fixed distance band is a more appropriate measure given the spatial
configuration of Los Angeles County, the results were similar for both spatial
references when they could be used to measure similar variables.
Global Moran’s I values were taken for the entire system for each of the years
in the sample, as well as a pooled data set. The results showed that positive spatial
association was statistically significant at the .01% level, which indicates
observations are more clustered than would be randomly predicted. The degree of
global system spatial association increased for each year in the sample for short
sales, and was highest in 2009 for REO. The pooled data set had higher Global
Moran’s I values respectively than any individual year in the sample. The
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strengthening of the spatial association indicates that contagion is occurring for
both distressed sales outcomes.
The final research chapter concludes with a study of the price discount
associated with distressed sales. The literature previously only investigated the
impact of REO, by adding short sales to the analysis, a determination of their relative
impacts can be made. Results from the hedonic price model showed that short sales
had almost three times less of a price discount compared to REO. Each additional
short sale has an average a .47% reduction on sales in the same census tract, for
REO the impact is 1.7%. This is a crucial finding that ties together the other two
empirical chapters.

It can be demonstrated that short sales have less of a

detrimental impact on neighborhood pricing. The results of chapter 2 and 3 focus
on differentiating consumer decision‐making regarding distressed sales and also
identify the underlying spatial associations; which are important findings given the
lessened price reduction associated with short sales.
Understanding the neighborhood variables that promote short sales or
reduce the likelihood of foreclosure allow for the creation of policy to encourage the
preferred outcome of short sales. The spatial associations identified allow for
localized targeted policy‐making to help encourage social stigmas that will reduce
foreclosure and/or promote short sales.
An example of the economic impact that promoting short sales compared to
foreclosure becomes clear when a comparison of the mean values is forecast for a
reduction in foreclosures. The mean number of REO sales for each census tract in
Los Angeles County for 2009 was 11. There were a total of 65,003 sales in 2009,
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which represents a mean of 32 per tract, with a mean sales price of $462,295. If
25% of the REOs could be converted to short sales, it would increase the sales price
by 3.4% (1.23% * 11 foreclosures * 25%) for each of the properties sold in the each
census tract. This would generate an additional $502,976 in equity gains for every
census tract for the year 2009 alone.
Future studies where individual mortgage data is paired with sales data
would be better able measure individual consumer decision‐making, rather than
attempting to use neighborhood level proxies. In addition, the methodology used in
this study could be expanded to other areas of the country to determine if the effects
can be generalized to all areas. The emergence of spatial vector autoregressive
models will make for an ideal methodology combining the various methodologies
used in the three chapters into a more complete parsimonious model.
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